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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay is a study of strategic firm competition in a differentiated
product environment. We develop a tractable spatial model of oligopolistic competition in which firms endogenously
determine both franchise/product locations and prices. Remarkably, we find that firms are completely unsuccessful
at exploiting endogenous product-specific heterogeneity, whenever, it is the sole source of heterogeneity: while ex-
post consumer heterogeneity ensures positive gross profits, competition for market share results in socially excessive
product lines and zero net profits. We then introduce exogenous taste heterogeneity, so that consumers also differ in
their ex-ante preferences over product lines. We prove that price competition due to the endogenous spatial hetero-
geneity drives profits below what they would be with only taste heterogeneity. Finally, we introduce multiple product
lines, and show that when the product costs differ across product lines, firms earn positive profits as long as consumer
preferences over product lines are not perfectly correlated.
The second essay is a study of optimal voting rules. Society tastes for government policy vary over time, as
society itself changes. Ceteris paribus, having a legislature that can freely tailor policy to reflect these changing tastes
is good. However, the composition of a legislature may not always be reflective of society. In particular, the views
of the median legislator may sometimes be rather different than those of the median citizen in society: An unchecked
legislature can sometimes implement bad policy. The legislative process itself, by choosing more extreme agenda
setters, may generate less representative outcomes. We consider both the possibility that the proposer of policy each
period is the median member of the legislature and the standard assumption that the proposer is a randomly selected
legislator. A proposal is adopted only if it wins approval from a sufficient fraction of the legislature against a status quo
corresponding to the policy in the previous period. Building in more inertia amounts to requiring a larger supermajority
for approval. Somewhat surprisingly, it is possible that increasing the probability of drawing a less representative
legislature reduces the optimal supermajority. Also, building a source of moderacy into who proposes legislation (i.e.,
the proposer is the median legislator, rather than a randomly selected member of the legislature) may make it optimal
to increase the supermajority.
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Chapter 1
Competitive Franchising
1.1 Introduction
What happens when firms compete using both product locations and prices? More concretely, how does Wendy’s
compete against Burger King, or Coca-Cola compete against PepsiCo, and how successful will they be at exploiting
endogenous product-specific heterogeneity to extract profits?
These questions get at the heart of competition between firms. However, these questions remain unanswered by the
profession due to the intractability of endogenizing product location and pricing in standard spatial models, where opti-
mal pricing hinges sensitively on the specific details about the locations of each and every product variety or franchise.
We develop a novel spatial structure to get at these questions. We first explore an environment in which consumers
receive firm-specific location shocks, in which a consumer’s location relative to one firm’s product line/franchise
network is uncorrelated with his location relative to another firm’s product line. The other features of our economy
are standard. First, firms choose product locations and prices. Then, consumers receive spatial location shocks and
choose where to shop given the prices and distances from product locations.
In our base model, the only source of consumer heterogeneity is the spatial heterogeneity that firms endogenously
introduce via their location choices. We prove that when consumers are distributed uniformly across spatial locations,
firms optimally spread their products evenly and set the same price at each product location. Prices reflect only the
average properties of the two networks—summarized by each firm’s concentration of product locations.
With these results in hand, we characterize equilibrium product/franchise concentration and pricing. The ex-post
heterogeneity in the distances consumers must travel to each firm’s franchise locations, reduces the elasticity of de-
mand, and hence price competition. As a result, firms price above marginal cost and generate positive gross profits, i.e.,
profits before consideration of franchise location costs. However, we derive a stark result for net profits: competition
for market share via franchise concentration completely exhausts the profits generated by the ex-post heterogeneity.
That is, the gross profits from product sales just cover the costs of establishing the franchises. We then prove that this
qualitative finding extends when there is additional heterogeneity between firms so that one firm has a “better prod-
uct”, one that, ceteris paribus, all consumers prefer, and/or has lower costs of franchise development: in equilibrium,
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the “disadvantaged” firm earns zero net profits.
From a social welfare perspective, this competition for market share results in over-provision of franchises—the
competitive equilibrium features more franchises than a social planner would choose. Because higher franchise con-
centrations imply lower prices, an immediate implication is that firm profits are lower and consumer surplus is higher
in the competitive equilibrium, than they would be were franchise locations chosen by a social planner.
We then introduce additional exogenous heterogeneity in consumer preferences between firms and determine how
competition on endogenous spatial dimensions spills over to affect the profits that firms derive from exogenous taste
heterogeneity. Specifically, we allow for consumer heterogeneity along a non-spatial dimension—so that, for example,
ex-ante, some consumers prefer Wendy’s hamburgers, while others prefer Burger King’s.
It is immediate that, in equilibrium, firms can exploit exogenous heterogeneity in tastes to extract positive net
profits. What is surprising is the extent of competition on the endogenous spatial dimension: the resulting intensified
price competition drives profits below what they would be were the spatial dimension absent so that consumers were
distinguished solely by their tastes for one firm’s product. Indeed, in the neighborhood of zero taste heterogeneity,
endogenous spatial heterogeneity causes firms to compete away fully three-quarters of the possible profit gain from
introducing slight taste heterogeneity. The profit loss due to competition on product location grows as taste hetero-
geneity increases up to the point that there is so much exogenous taste heterogeneity that the price in the economy
without the endogenous spatial dimension is the same as that when the spatial dimension is present. At this point, firms
extract no benefits from the franchises that they establish: all franchise establishment costs are, in essence, wasted.
We conclude our analysis by extending our model to a multi-product line setting in which each firm is associated
with two product lines (say sodas and juices). Correlation in taste across product lines implies a consumer whose most
preferred product from one firm is a soda is more likely to most prefer a soda from the other firm. While a preference
for Coke could reveal a likely preference for sodas over juices, we maintain the assumption that this preference for
Coke reveals nothing about preferences for Diet Pepsi versus Pepsi.
Correlation alone does not change our findings: with perfectly-positively correlated preferences, so that a con-
sumer either prefers sodas from both firms or prefers juices, intra-firm competition decomposes to two competitions,
one over soda and one over juice. Our earlier analysis then implies that firms compete all profits away. However,
matters are different when (a) preferences are imperfectly correlated so that a consumer who prefers a soda from one
firm may prefer a juice from the other firm and (b) product provision costs differ across product lines, so that, say
juices are more expensive to develop than sodas. Firms still compete away all profits from their more expensive prod-
uct line, but they earn positive profits from their less expensive products. Specifically, firms profit from consumers
who prefer its inexpensive product, but the other firm’s expensive product. The intuition for this result is that because
a firm stocks its inexpensive product line more extensively, sometimes that line will compete against itself for some
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consumers, rather than against the other firm’s expensive product line—some consumers will prefer more than one
product on a firm’s inexpensive line to any of the other firm’s products. Firms internalize this own product line com-
petition, and do not expand their inexpensive product lines to the same extent. In turn, this reduces the intensity of
price competition, with the result that firms extract strictly positive profits. Interestingly, while profits go to zero as
the correlation in preferences across product lines goes to one, profits are not globally decreasing in this correlation:
raising the probability that a consumer who likes one firm’s inexpensive product likes an expensive product from the
other firm lowers profits once this probability is high enough.
The paper’s outline is as follows. We next highlight our methodology and discuss related research. In section 1.2
we show that an optimal response to any franchise network structure of the other firm features identical pricing at each
franchise and franchise locations that equate market shares of each franchise. We then assume these features and treat
the number of franchises of a firm as a continuous variable, focusing on the concentration of franchises. In section 1.3
we first develop our core continuous model with two symmetric firms. We proceed to consider an asymmetric duopoly
setting and then a symmetric N -firm setting. The section concludes by contrasting equilibrium outcomes with that
preferred by a social planner. Section 1.4 explores how heterogeneous consumer tastes affect outcomes. Section 1.5
investigates competition between product lines. Section 1.6 concludes. All proofs are in Section 1.7.
Methodology and Related Research. Using spatial concepts to model economic phenomena, and market structure in
particular, dates back to Hotelling [1929]. Subsequent notable contributions include Lancaster [1971], d’Aspremont
et al. [1979] and Salop [1979]. Existing research on competition in product lines have largely focused on the simpler
problem of endogenizing the range of appeal for a single product, supposing that firms provide a product characterized
by an interval [a, b] (see Dewan et al. [2000, 2003] or Alexandrov [2008]). Other related research includes Bernhardt
et al. [2007], which models product customization, where firms invest in technologies that consumers can use to im-
perfectly tailor the product to their preferences; and Bernhardt and Massoud [2005], which models the design of ATM
networks.
The issue of franchise location and pricing has remained open primarily because solving for equilibrium outcomes
when franchise location and pricing is endogenous is infeasible in standard models. To ensure that a posited set of
(price, location) strategies is an equilibrium, one must verify that no deviation in location or prices can raise profits—
and in standard spatial settings, payoffs are not quasi-concave or continuous for all possible location choices, so that
pure strategy equilibria typically do not exist.1 Only recently, did Vogel [2008] make the breakthrough to solve for the
equilibrium locations and prices when firms have a single product and heterogeneous marginal costs of production.
His key insight was that one did not need to fully characterize off-equilibrium mixed-strategy outcomes to determine
1de Palma et al. [1985] obtain existence by adding heterogeneous consumer tastes that are orthogonal to the spatial dimension, using a multi-
nomial logit specification: with sufficient consumer heterogeneity, equilibria in pure strategies exist when firms compete simultaneously over both
price and location.
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the equilibrium path. While Vogel’s model must confront asymmetries, each firm still chooses a single location, rather
than a product line. In particular, there is no clear way to extend his approach, and optimal pricing with asymmetries
across local franchise markets will hinge sensitively on the precise details of all franchise locations.
Our spatial model remains tractable even in asymmetric settings in which firms are heterogeneous along multiple
dimensions. The source of this tractability is the coarse information conveyed to a firm by the nature of a consumer’s
preference for its most preferred product about the intensity of preferences for its competitor’s products: the con-
sumer’s distance to its preferred firm A product can convey information about which firm B product is closest (juice
or soda), but it reveals nothing about the intensity of those preferences. Concretely, if Diet Pepsi is a consumer’s
most preferred Pepsi product, differences in the distance to Diet Pepsi convey no information about preferences for
Coke vs. Sprite. While this abstraction is a simplification that does not perfectly describe actual preferences; so too
is the standard spatial assumption that a consumer’s preference for Diet Pepsi relative to Pepsi exactly determines the
preference for Coke relative to Sprite.
1.2 Discrete Model
Our core model develops a spatial oligopoly game between two firms, A and B. The firms compete to provide a
product to a measure 1 of consumers. Each firm is associated with its own spatial circle with circumference of length
L along which consumers are uniformly distributed. The firm must choose where on its spatial circle to establish its
franchises or products—we use the terms franchise and product location interchangeably. Consumers must travel to a
franchise location to purchase a product, incurring a linear travel cost of Td from traveling distance d, where T > 0.2
The cost to a firm of establishing a franchise at any point on its spatial circle is F > 0. Hence, the total cost to firm
j ∈ {A,B} of establishing nj franchises is njF . The marginal cost of providing the good is constant and normalized
to 0. Firms seek to maximize profit.
We index firm j’s franchises by 1, 2, . . . nj , and let Nj = {1, . . . , nj}. We define lji to be the location of the
ith franchise of firm j. Without loss of generality we normalize the location of franchise j1 to lj1 = 0 and order
franchises so that lji < lji+1 . One can interpret franchise locations as the store locations (e.g., of Wendy’s franchises)
in a franchise network or as the characteristics locations (e.g., of Coca-Cola soft drink flavors) of a firm’s product line.
Franchise i of firm j charges price pji for its product. A strategy for firm j is a franchise profile Sj = [nj , {lji , pji}nji=1]
that specifies the number of franchises, each franchise location, and the price set by each franchise. The set of possible
franchise profiles for firm j is Σj .
A consumer receives utility V from the homogeneous good that the two firms sell. We assume that V is large
enough that, in equilibrium, all consumers purchase the good. After firms simultaneously choose franchise profiles,
2Our central results extend when consumers incur quadratic travel costs, Td2.
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Figure 1.1: Consumer c’s location shock, dcA for firm A is independent of his location shock for B. lji is the location
of firm j’s ith franchise.
consumers receive firm-specific location shocks, dA and dB . For firm j, a given consumer c is equally likely to be
located at any point on firm j’s circle, and c’s location on firm A’s spatial circle is uncorrelated with his location
on firm B’s spatial circle. Figure 1.1 shows a potential location realization for consumer c. These location shocks
could reflect geographical differentiation, or product characteristic differentiation with associated dis-utility from not
consuming at one’s most preferred point in the characteristic space. The location shocks are easiest to interpret in
characteristic space: for example, a consumer may prefer Diet Coke to Sprite, i.e., be closer to Diet Coke than to
Sprite in characteristic space, but be equally likely to prefer Pepsi or Diet Pepsi.
We define δcj(Sj , S−j) to be an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if consumer c purchases from a firm j
franchise and is 0 otherwise. Consumer c maximizes utility when
δcj(Sj , S−j) =

1 if min
i∈Nj
{pji + T |lji − dcj |} < min
i∈N−j
{p−ji + T |l−ji − dc−j |}
0 if min
i∈Nj
{pji + T |lji − dcj |} > min
i∈N−j
{p−ji + T |l−ji − dc−j |},
where dcj is consumer c’s location shock for firm j.
Given franchise profiles (SA, SB), let yji(dj , SA, SB) be the conditional probability that a consumer with location
shock dj purchases from franchise ji and let Yji(SA, SB) be the expected measure of consumers who purchase from
franchise ji. Explicit solutions for yji(dj , SA, SB) and Yji(SA, SB) are in the Appendix. Then firm j’s profits are
pij(SA, SB) =
nj∑
i=1
pjiYji(SA, SB)− njF, j ∈ {A,B}.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a collection of (i) franchise profiles, S∗j = [n∗j , {l∗ji , p∗ji}
nj
i=1], j ∈ {A,B}, and (ii) a
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set of demand functions for each consumer c, δc∗j (SA, SB), such that
• Franchise profiles maximize profit pij(S∗j , S∗−j) ≥ pij(Sˆj , S∗−j) ∀Sˆj ∈ Σj , j ∈ {A,B} given subsequent
optimization by almost all consumers, and
• Almost every consumer maximizes utility.
We first characterize how a firm’s own franchises compete with each other for consumers. To do this, we develop
the notion of franchise ji’s service area—the set of optimizing consumers who, if they purchase from firm j, will
do so at franchise ji. In any equilibrium, each of firm j’s franchises must be patronized by some customers (else
the costly franchise ought not be built); however, among consumers who purchase from firm j, only those who are
sufficiently nearby franchise ji will patronize it. Accordingly, we let aji,i+1(Sj) be the identity of the consumer who
is indifferent between purchasing from firm j at franchises ji and ji+1:
aji,i+1(Sj) =
pji+1 − pji
2T
+
lji+1 + lji
2
, ∀i ∈ Nj , j ∈ {A,B},
where lj1 = 0 and ljnj+1 = L (the position of the first franchise from the viewpoint of the last franchise). Any op-
timizing consumer located outside of [aji−1,i(Sj), aji,i+1(Sj)] who purchases from firm j can derive a higher payoff
by patronizing a firm j franchise other than ji (in particular, patronizing either franchise ji+1 or ji−1).
Definition 1. Franchise ji is isolated if
yji(aji−1,i(Sj), SA, SB) = yji(aji,i+1(Sj), SA, SB) = 0.
Definition 2. Franchise ji is connected if
min{yji(aji−1,i(Sj), SA, SB), yji(aji,i+1(Sj), SA, SB)} > 0.
Franchise ji is isolated if ji does not compete against other firm j franchises for market share. In particular, if
franchise ji is isolated, then an individual located at aji−1,i(Sj), who is indifferent between purchasing from ji and
ji−1, prefers with probability one to purchase from the other firm. If a firm’s franchises are isolated, then its franchises
only compete for customers against the other firm, and not against each other. In contrast, franchise ji is connected
if, in addition to competing against the other firm, it competes for customers with an adjacent franchise, ji−1 or ji+1.
That is, franchise ji is connected if there is a strictly positive probability that a consumer who is indifferent between
patronizing ji and a neighboring franchise strictly prefers those alternatives to patronizing any of the other firm’s
franchises. We first establish an important result for how a firm’s franchises compete against each other.
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Lemma 1. In firm j’s best response, either all of its franchises are isolated or all of its franchises are connected.
The intuition for this result is that if a firm had a mix of isolated and connected franchises then it would be able
to earn higher profits by bringing its isolated franchises marginally closer together and spreading its other franchises
marginally further apart, even if it did not change its prices at different franchises. Bringing isolated franchises
marginally closer would not affect their market shares because these franchises do not compete against each other for
customers; while the market shares of the remaining franchises would grow because their service areas increase. But
then the firm’s profits would be higher, a contradiction of the premise that the mix of isolated and connected franchises
was optimal.
Lemmas 2 and 3 characterize the implications of Lemma 1 for pricing and location.
Lemma 2. Suppose firm j’s best response to S−j has only isolated franchises. Then firm j’s best response features
identical pricing at each franchise and equal market shares.
If each firm j franchise is isolated, then each has the same demand. Therefore, charging the same price at each
franchise, and capturing the same market share, is a best response.
Now consider a firm with connected franchises. The analogous result to Lemma 2 is that this firm does best to
space its franchises equally, and set the same price at each franchise. To prove this we first show that equal spacing
and identical pricing solves the firm’s first-order conditions for profit maximization; an exhaustive numerical analysis
then indicates that this strategy is the unique best response.
Lemma 3. Suppose firm j’s best response to S−j has only connected franchises. Then firm j’s best response spaces
franchises at equal distances and sets identical prices.
These lemmas reveal that our model delivers key empirical features of the franchise industry. In particular, an
optimizing firm sets the same price for its product at each franchise, regardless of the structure of the competing firm’s
franchise network. Of course, the optimal level of this price reflects the competing network. A corollary is that with-
out loss of generality, we can restrict attention to strategies that feature franchise profiles with uniform pricing and
equidistant franchise spacing, and consider demand for a representative firm j franchise. We now do this, treating the
number of franchises as a continuous variable and focusing on a firm’s choice of franchise concentration. As L gets
large, this approximation approaches the outcome for an integer number of franchises. Because we now focus on a
representative firm j franchise, we use dcj to measure the distance of consumer c from a firm j franchise.
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1.3 Continuous Model
Symmetric Duopoly. In a symmetric setting, without loss of generality, we can assume that pA ≥ pB . We first prove
that if pA ≥ pB , then, in equilibrium, firm B’s franchises are isolated, competing only for the market share from firm
A franchises, and not cannibalizing market share from its own franchise family. In turn, this will imply that firm B
cannot earn positive profits.
dAL
2nA
dB = dA +
pA−pB
T
Y A
YB
pA−pB
T
dB
L
2nB
1.2.1: Market shares when firm B franchises are isolated.
dAL
2nA
dB = dA +
pA−pB
T
YA
YB
pA−pB
T
dB
L
2nB
1.2.2: Market shares when firm A franchises are isolated.
Figure 1.2: Market shares when pA ≥ pB . Area Yj denotes the expected market share for firm j. The density of the
area is 4nAnB/L2.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the market shares captured by each firm under the two possible scenarios (under the main-
tained assumption that pA ≥ pB in equilibrium). In each graph, area Yj captures firm j’s expected market share
and from the firms’ perspective, consumers are uniformly distributed over the graph with a density of 4nAnB/L2.
Consider a consumer c who receives a location shock pair that puts him on the edge of each of the representative
franchise’s service areas, i.e., (dcA, d
c
B) = (L/(2nA), L/(2nB)). Figure 1.2.1 illustrates the case where
L
2nB
>
pA − pB
T
+
L
2nA
. (1.1)
Then this marginal consumer prefers to purchase from firm A, implying that firm B franchises are isolated. Figure
1.2.2 illustrates the other possibility, i.e., where
L
2nB
<
pA − pB
T
+
L
2nA
. (1.2)
Then the marginal consumer prefers to purchase from firm B, implying that the firm A franchises are isolated. Hence,
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if firm B franchises are isolated, i.e., if equation (1.1) holds, then
YA =
4nAnB
L2
∫ L
2nA
0
∫ L
2nB
dA+
pA−pB
T
ddBddA
= 1− nB
2nA
− 2nB pA − pB
LT
, and (1.3)
YB = 1− YA = nB
2nA
+ 2nB
pA − pB
LT
. (1.4)
If, instead, firm A franchises are isolated, i.e., if equation (1.2) holds, then
YA =
4nAnB
L2
∫ L
2nA
− pA−pBT
0
∫ L
2nB
dA+
pA−pB
T
ddBddA
=
nA
2nB
(
1− 2nB pA − pB
LT
)2
(1.5)
YB = 1− YA = 1− nA
2nB
(
1− 2nB pA − pB
LT
)2
. (1.6)
Lemma 4 below shows that if p∗A ≥ p∗B , then, in equilibrium, we can restrict attention to an environment where
firm B franchises are isolated, the case illustrated in Figure 1.2.1.
Lemma 4. If p∗A ≥ p∗B then Y ∗A ≥ Y ∗B and firm B franchises are isolated in equilibrium.
The intuition is that the marginal reduction in a firm’s market share due to raising its price is the same for both
firms. To see this, let pd = pA − pB . Then
∂YA
∂pA
=
∂YA
∂pd
=
∂(1− YB)
∂pd
= −∂YB
∂pd
=
∂YB
∂pB
.
The first-order conditions for profit maximization of each firm with respect to price gives
Y ∗A = −p∗A
∂Y ∗A
∂p∗A
and Y ∗B = −p∗B
∂Y ∗B
∂p∗B
.
Substituting for ∂YA∂pA =
∂YB
∂pB
yields
Y ∗A
Y ∗B
=
p∗A
p∗B
.
Therefore, p∗A ≥ p∗B implies Y ∗A ≥ Y ∗B . The proof reveals that a necessary condition for this is that the extreme
consumer, i.e., the consumer who is located L2nA from franchise A and
L
2nB
from franchise B, purchases from firm A;
that is, firm B has isolated franchises.
We now derive the consequences for equilibrium firm profits.
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Proposition 1. In the unique equilibrium, the two firms earn zero profits, the franchise concentration for both firms is
n∗j =
1
2
√
LT
2F and the price set at each franchise is p
∗
j =
√
FLT
2 .
To understand why firms earn zero profits in equilibrium, first consider the perspective of the weakly smaller firm
B that charges pB ≤ pA. From Lemma 4, B’s franchises must be isolated in equilibrium. Suppose that firm B earns
positive profit from its outlets (on average). In an asymmetric equilibrium, B’s franchises compete only with those
of the larger firm A. That is, when the smaller firm B increases its franchise concentration marginally, B only steals
customers away from firm A, and not from its own established franchises. Since marginal intra-firm competition is
zero and customers served per franchise is constant, adding franchises must increase B’s profit: over the range where
a firm’s franchises are isolated, profits are linearly increasing in the number of franchises, exhibiting “constant returns
to scale”. But this contradicts the premise that the weakly smaller firmB is optimizing, because it would then increase
profits by increasing its franchise concentration.
Now consider the possibility of an asymmetric equilibrium in which the larger firmA earns strictly positive profits.
But then a price deviation by firm B to pB = p∗A, must generate strictly positive profits, because its market share per
franchise is strictly higher. But then this deviation gives firm B strictly positive profit, a contradiction, as we just
showed that the smaller firm must earn zero profit.
Finally, consider the possibility of a symmetric equilibrium in which both firms earn strictly positive profits. But
then each firm has an incentive to increase franchise concentration marginally: The within-firm cannibalization of
market share from its other franchises due to increasing franchise concentration slightly is arbitrarily small and second
order, whereas the “new franchise” gains a market share and profit that is first order. That is, each firm’s franchises
are “almost” isolated. It follows that the firms compete profits down to zero: in equilibrium, firms fail to exploit
the ex-post heterogeneity in consumers that lead them to prefer one firm’s franchise to another’s. Even though the
firms earn positive gross (of franchise establishment costs) profits due to this heterogeneity, in equilibrium, the cost of
establishing franchises just offsets these profits. We next establish the robustness of these results.
Asymmetric costs and preferences. We now relax the symmetrical properties of the economic environment to allow
for
1. Firm specific heterogeneity in costs of establishing franchises, FA 6= FB .
2. Firm specific marginal costs of production, ci ≥ 0.
3. Consumers with preferences for one firm’s product: consumers derive a common utility V + a from firm A’s
product and V from firm B, where a could be positive or negative.
4. Firm specific heterogeneity in the dimensions of a firm’s spatial environment, LA 6= LB .
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Proposition 2. At least one firm earns zero profit in equilibrium.
To expand on this result consider a setting with a clearly-identifiable disadvantaged firm, say firm B. Specifically,
assume FB ≥ FA, cB ≥ cA = 0, LB ≥ LA and a ≥ 0, where at least one of these inequalities is strict.
Proposition 3. If FB ≥ FA, cB ≥ cA = 0, LB ≥ LA and a ≥ 0, with one inequality strict, then in the unique
equilibrium
• firm B earns zero profits and firm A earns positive profits,
• p∗B =
√
FBLBT
2 + cB < p
∗
A − a, and
• n∗A is the largest root of −8FA(2α + 3β)n3A + 4FALATn2A + 4LAT (α + β)nA − L2AT 2, where α = a+ cB
and β =
√
2FBLBT .
In equilibrium, the disadvantaged firm’s franchises are isolated. This implies that the disadvantaged firm scales up
franchise concentration to the point where its profits are zero, setting the price given in Proposition 3. The advantaged
firm exploits its preferred product and/or better franchise technology to earn positive profits. A numerical analysis
verifies the expected comparative statics: Firm A’s profits rise with a, cB , LB and FB and fall with FA and LA. More
interestingly,A’s profits fall with T : the reduction in price competition due to increased travel costs is more than offset
by the increase in franchise provision.
We next show in Proposition 4 that the finding that symmetric duopolists earn zero profit in the competitive
equilibrium extends to a symmetric N firm setting in which each consumer receives N uncorrelated firm-specific
location shocks.
Proposition 4. In the symmetric equilibrium with N firms, firms earn zero profits.
Again, the smallest firm’s franchises are isolated, and do not compete against each other. Therefore, the smallest
firm can scale up its franchises, as it earns the same profit per franchise. But then, the smallest firm—and hence each
firm in a symmetric setting—must earn zero profits in equilibrium. In a symmetric setting, an increase in the number
of firms N leads to smaller market shares for each franchise. As a result, firms reduce franchise concentration until
the market share for each franchise returns to its “original” level. Because firms earn zero profit in equilibrium and
market share per franchise does not change, the optimal price remains unchanged.
Social Planner’s Problem. We now return to a two firm setting3 and compare the competitive equilibrium outcome
with the solution to a social planner’s problem, in which the social planner maximizes total (consumer plus producer)
surplus by choosing franchise concentration for each firm; and then given this concentration choice, firms compete for
customers by setting price. To make the comparison to the symmetric competitive equilibrium meaningful, we require
3The analogue of the social planner Proposition 5 below extends generally to N firms.
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that the social planner establish the same franchise concentration for each firm. Because V is large enough that all
consumers purchase in equilibrium, prices just transfer surplus from consumers to firms, and hence do not affect total
social surplus. It follows that the social planner seeks to minimize the sum of travel and franchise establishment costs,
4nAnB
L2
∫ L
2nA
0
(∫ dA+ pA−pBT
0
TdBddBddA +
∫ L
2nB
dA+
pA−pB
T
TdAddB
)
ddA + F (nA + nB).
Proposition 5. The competitive concentration of franchises exceeds the socially optimal concentration.
It follows from Proposition 5 that at the social optimum, firms earn strictly positive profits. Intuitively, the com-
petitive over-provision of franchises results from the efforts of firms to compete for greater market share. The social
planner internalizes this externality: the social planner does not care about the market share of individual firms, but
the firms do.
1.4 Additional Taste Heterogeneity
We now investigate how outcomes are affected when, in addition to the endogenous contestable spatial consumer
heterogeneity, consumers also differ exogenously in their intrinsic taste for each firm’s product. For example, in a
franchise setting, some consumers may like Wendy’s hamburgers more than Burger King’s, while other consumers
have the opposite preference. So, too, in a product line setting, some consumers may prefer the marketing or branding
by one firm (e.g., Nike’s swoosh) that is common to that firm’s product line, while other consumers prefer another
firm’s branding.
Specifically, we suppose that in the population of consumers, the relative valuation z of firm A is uniformly dis-
tributed on [−m,m], where m > 0. A consumer with a relative valuation of z gains an additional value (in dollar
terms) of z/2 from purchasing firm A’s good and loses z/2 from purchasing firm B’s good. As a result, consumer
preferences will differ due to both (i) the endogenous spatial distance between a consumer’s location and a firm’s prod-
uct locations, and (ii) to the exogenous differences in their relative tastes for firm A’s product line. The magnitude of
m captures the importance of the exogenous taste heterogeneity relative to the endogenous spatial heterogeneity.
Now when consumers make their purchases they consider their relative preferences (or dispreferences) for firm A:
for almost every consumer, δcB(z, SA, SB) = 1 if and only if
V +
z
2
− pA − TdcA ≥ V −
z
2
− pB − TdcB .
Ex ante, the probability a consumer shops at a firmA franchise is Prob(dcA−dcB− zT ≤ pB−pAT ). In Figures 1.3.1 and
1.3.2, the area above the plane shows firm A’s market share when taste heterogeneity is small and large, respectively.
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1.3.1: Market shares when m is small.
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1.3.2: Market shares when m is large.
Figure 1.3: Market shares with heterogeneous consumers. The cube represents the distribution of consumer’s firm
locations shocks (relative to a franchise location) and taste preferences. The plane represents the set of location and
taste shocks for which consumers are indifferent between purchasing from firm A and firm B.
Proposition 6. In a symmetric firm setting with heterogeneity in consumer tastes, i.e., m > 0, firms earn strictly
positive profits. If m ≤ √2FLT then
p∗ =
2FLT√
8FLT −m, n
∗ =
1
2
√
LT
2F
, and pi∗ =
m
√
2FLT
4(
√
8FLT −m) .
If m >
√
2FLT then
p∗ = m, n∗ =
1
2
√
LT
2F
, and pi∗ =
1
2
(
m−
√
FLT
2
)
.
Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 6 reveals that the equilibrium number of franchises, n∗ = 12
√
LT
2F ,
does not depend on whether consumers have heterogeneous tastes. Why then is it that firms now earn strictly positive
profits? The answer is that a consumer located on the extreme of a firm j franchise service area, i.e., dcj = L/(2n),
now prefers with strictly positive probability to purchase from firm j: some of these consumers have a large relative
preference for firm j, and want to patronize a firm j franchise. Hence, were firm j to reduce its price at one franchise,
it would now steal consumers from its other franchises. As a result, firms have lesser incentives to reduce prices, and
the weakened price competition allows firms to earn strictly positive profits in equilibrium.
As before, the competitive equilibrium still features over-provision of franchises—one can show that a social
planner would choose a lesser franchise concentration than what emerges in the competitive equilibrium. Again, this
reflects that the social planner internalizes the competition for market share via franchise location.
The comparative statics are straightforward. As m increases, firms exploit the increased taste heterogeneity to
increase profit. Profits are a decreasing function of FLT . This is because increasing FLT makes consumer demand
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more sensitive to endogenous spatial heterogeneity and less sensitive to the exogenous taste heterogeneity: as L or F
increase, franchises are located further away, and as T increases, consumers weigh more the costs of travel. Because
consumer demand is less affected by consumer tastes, any marginal price reduction at one franchise steals/cannibalizes
fewer consumers from its other franchises. Hence, relative to an economy with only spatial heterogeneity [where firms
earn zero profit], the costs of aggressive price cutting are reduced, implying that firm profits fall.
That firms earn positive profits when there is exogenous heterogeneity in consumer preferences between firms is
not surprising. The more revealing question is: relative to an economy where firms only differ on an exogenous taste
dimension, how does introducing a contestable spatial dimension affect firm profits? Recall that in our benchmark
spatial setting with homogeneous firms, firms competed away all profits through franchise concentration. As a result,
one might conjecture that adding consumer heterogeneity in tastes might not alter firm profits, especially since equi-
librium franchise concentration is unaffected by the extent of the consumer heterogeneity in tastes. We show that this
is not so—heterogeneity in tastes intensifies price competition. In particular, Proposition 7 shows that not only do
firms compete away all profits from the spatial dimension, but they also compete away some of the rents that accrue
due to the exogenous heterogeneity in consumer tastes.
Proposition 7. Firms earn larger profits when exogenous tastes are the sole source of consumer heterogeneity than
when there is also endogenous consumer spatial heterogeneity.
To understand Proposition 7, consider the impact of introducing a slight consumer heterogeneity in tastes to the
spatial model. For m <
√
2FLT , a marginal increase in taste heterogeneity has a differential impact on profits in the
two environments of:
∂pi∗NC
∂m
− ∂pi
∗
C,NC
∂m
=
1
2
[1− 2FLT
(2
√
2FLT −m)2 ] > 0,
where pi∗NC is equilibrium firm profit when there is only taste heterogeneity and pi
∗
C,NC is equilibrium firm profit when
there is also a endogenous heterogeneity along a spatial dimension. In the neighborhood ofm = 0, ∂pi
∗
NC
∂m −
∂pi∗C,NC
∂m =
1
4 : introducing spatial heterogeneity causes firms to compete away fully three-quarters of the potential value of an in-
crease in taste heterogeneity,m. Asm increases further, price cuts would cannibalize a greater fraction of demand that
would be taken by a firm’s other franchises, causing firms to compete away smaller fractions of the potential profit.
Still, the marginal profit loss remains positive, and at m =
√
2FLT , the total accumulated profit loss equals the
total franchise establishment cost. In particular, for m ≥ √2FLT , equilibrium pricing only reflects the exogenous
taste dimension—price in the economy without the endogenous spatial dimension is the same as that when the spatial
dimension is present. It follows that the firms extract no benefits from the franchises that they establish, and that all
franchise establishment costs are, in some sense, wasted.
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1.5 Competition between Product Lines
We now introduce multiple product lines for the two firms, allowing for both meaningful correlation in consumer
preferences across product lines, and for differences in the costs of creating products across product lines. Concretely,
we let a preference for Diet Coke reveal a likely preference for soda drinks over fruit juices, and sodas can be less
expensive to provide, but we maintain the assumption that a preference for Diet Coke over Coke reveals nothing about
preferences for Diet Pepsi vs. Pepsi. So, too, a preference for a Honda Odyssey may suggest a likely preference for
vans, but a consumer’s preferred Toyota could turn out to be a Camry.
To model multiple product lines, we assume that firms A and B have products associated with two spatial circles,
which, for simplicity, we assume have the same length, L. Each consumer is located on one spatial circle for each
firm. The cost of traveling distance d on a circle is Td, and the travel costs between a firm’s circles are “high enough”
that in equilibrium a consumer always purchases a product on one of the circles on which he or she is located. The
unconditional probability that a consumer is located on a circle i is one-half, i = 1, 2. We introduce correlation in
preferences over the products of the two firms by supposing that if a consumer is located on circle i of firm A, then the
conditional probability that the consumer is located on circle i for firmB is ρ (and vice versa for a consumer located on
circle i for firm B).4 We introduce heterogeneity between product lines by assuming that the cost F1 of introducing a
product variety on circle 1 exceeds the cost F2 of a product variety on circle 2, i.e., F1 ≥ F2. Introducing heterogeneity
along other dimensions (e.g., spatial distances) gives rise to analogous results; and relaxing the assumption that, ex
ante, a citizen is equally likely to be on each circle is routine. We renormalize the measure of consumers to two.
The total profit function for firm j = A,B becomes
pij = pj1(ρYj11 + (1− ρ)Yj12) + pj2(ρYj22 + (1− ρ)Yj21)− (F1nj1 + F2nj2),
where, for example, YAik denotes the measure of consumers who purchase from firm A when they are located on
circle i of firm A and circle k of firm B, i, k = 1, 2, and we omit the dependence of these measures on prices and
numbers of products.
Proposition 8. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, both firms charge price pi and have ni
product varieties on circle i, i = 1, 2. Firms earn zero profits from their products on circle 1 where product varieties
are more expensive. For ρ ∈ [0, 1) and F1 > F2, firms choose n2 > n1 and earn strictly positive profits of at least
4Reisinger [2006] studies product bundling in a duopolistic multi-product environment with an ostensibly similar preference structure. His
model features two products x1 and x2, each with their own spatial circle, both produced by two firms A and B, where firm A is located at 0
on both circles, while B is located directly opposite at 1/2. A consumer located at x1 on circle 1 is located on x1 + δ on circle 2, where δ is a
parameter that provides a measure of how many consumers are most likely to prefer both of one firm’s products. Thus, although his set up has a
multi-product feature to address strategic bundling, Reisinger’s model has more in common with standard spatial models than with our’s: in his
model, firm locations are exogenous, and given knowledge about a consumer’s preference for firm A’s first product, one can exactly determine the
consumer’s preference for all other products.
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(1−ρ)p2(Y21− n12n2 ) > 0 from their less expensive product varieties on circle 2. Firms set p1 =
√
LTF1
2 and p1 > p2
if and only if ρ > ρ∗, where ρ∗ =
√
F2
√
8F1+F2−3F2
2(F1−F2) ∈ (0, 23 ). At ρ∗, n2n1 = F1F2 .
Intuition for this proposition can be gleaned by considering the extreme scenarios of perfectly positive and negative
correlation in consumer preferences, i.e., ρ = 1 and ρ = 0. When ρ = 1, a consumer on firm A’s circle 1 is also on
circle 1 of firm B; and when ρ = 0, a consumer on firm A’s circle 1 is on firm B’s circle 2. When ρ = 1, firm j’s
profits become
2∑
k=1
pjkYjkk − Fknjk .
Firm j’s profits from circle k only depend on the prices and product variety choices by the two firms on their kth circles.
The separability of the profit function across the spatial circles immediately implies that equilibrium is characterized
by Proposition 1: the firms compete against each other on a circle-by-circle basis, setting prices pk =
√
LTFk
2 , earning
zero profits. Note that F1 > F2 implies that p1 > p2, and n1 < n2.
Conversely, when ρ = 0, a consumer who is on firm A’s circle 2 is on firm B’s circle 1, where products are more
expensive to produce. Again profit functions are separable, with each firm having an advantaged circle 2 competing
against a disadvantage circle 1, and a disadvantaged circle 1 competing against an advantaged circle 2. It immedi-
ately follows that equilibrium is characterized by Proposition 3, with firms earning zero expected profits from their
disadvantaged circle 1, setting price p1 =
√
LTF1
2 and earning strictly positive profits from their advantaged circle
2, charging p2 > p1, as they exploit their more extensive product line. The proof shows that these qualitative results
extend to intermediate levels of correlation, i.e., to ρ ∈ (0, 1).
The general intuition is that cost differences induce firms to provide more products on their inexpensive lines than
on their expensive ones. Moreover, some consumers are located on one firm’s inexpensive product line, but the other
firm’s expensive product line. Because the inexpensive product line is more extensively stocked, i.e., n2 > n1, it
competes against itself for some consumers—some consumers strictly prefer more than one product on one firm’s
inexpensive line to any of the other firm’s products. Firms internalize this own product line competition by not
expanding their inexpensive product lines to the same extent. This reduces the intensity of price competition, so that
firms extract strictly positive profits.
The analysis makes clear that profits go to zero as correlation in preferences goes high, i.e., ρ → 1, or as cost
heterogeneity goes to zero, i.e., F1 → F2. What is not clear is how intermediate levels of correlation affect profits
when cost heterogeneity is significant. We investigate this quantitatively, exploring how ρ ∈ [0, 1] affects equilibrium
outcomes when F1 = 1 and F2 = 12 , so that products on circle 1 are twice as expensive to produce as those on circle
2 (implying that p1 > p2 if and only if ρ > ρ∗ ∼ 0.562). We normalize
√
LT = 100.
Figures 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 graph profits and n2n1 as a function of ρ. As ρ is reduced below 1, profits initially increase
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1.4.1: Firm profits as a function of ρ.
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Figure 1.4: Firm profits and firm franchise ratios as a function of ρ. Parameters: F1 = 1, F2 = 12 ,
√
LT = 100.
sharply (convexly) from zero, but then the rate of increase slows down, and profits are maximized when ρ ∼ 0.124. In
particular, maximizing the probability 1− ρ that an inexpensive product line competes against the expensive product
line of the other firm does not maximize firm profits. The direct effect on profits of reducing ρ is always positive.
However, at ρ ∼ 0.393, n1 reaches a minimum and n2 reaches a maximum, implying that n1n2 begins to rise as ρ is
reduced further below 0.393. The intuition is that as ρ falls, a firm’s product line 2 increasingly competes against itself
for customers who are also located on the other firm’s expensive product line, eventually causing a firm to reduce
its n2. Once ρ falls below 0.124, the increase in n1n2 swamps the direct increase in (1 − ρ), and profits begin to fall.
Still, it is important to recognize that any plausible parameterization has ρ > 0.5, e.g., a consumer who prefers one
firm’s soda to its juices is more likely to prefer a soda from the other firm to its juices. This suggests that for plausible
parameterizations, both n2n1 and firm profits strictly increase as ρ is reduced, i.e., as the inexpensive product line is
more likely to compete against the expensive one.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper endogenizes both firm pricing and franchise location within a novel spatial model in which consumers
receive firm-specific location shocks. This renders the analysis with endogenous franchising feasible. We establish a
remarkable result: when the product is homogeneous, then in the unique equilibrium, firms earn zero profits—firms
over-provide franchises to such an extent that they compete away all profits. That is, even though firms face ex-post
consumer heterogeneity they fail to exploit it: while ex-post consumer heterogeneity ensures positive gross firm prof-
its, competition for market share via franchise location drives net firm profits down to zero. This qualitative result
extends when firms differ in franchise costs or a firm has a better product: the “disadvantaged” firm continues to make
zero net profits. We show that this competitive provision of franchises is socially excessive—a social planner internal-
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izes the competition for market share and chooses a lesser franchise concentration. It follows that, in the competitive
equilibrium, firm profits are lower and consumer surplus is higher than they would be were franchise concentration
chosen by a social planner.
We then introduce an additional exogenous taste source of consumer heterogeneity. Firms profit from this exoge-
nous taste heterogeneity. However, we find that the contestable spatial dimension enhances price competition, causing
firms to compete profits from exogenous taste heterogeneity below those that would obtain were there no endogenous
spatial heterogeneity.
Finally, we show that our model remains tractable even in the presence of significant heterogeneity across aspects
of firms. As such, our model can be used as the foundation for the analyses of competition between networks in other
settings. In particular, our framework remains tractable when firms have multiple product lines, and a preference for
a good from one firm’s product line contains information about likely preferences over the other firm’s product lines.
What is crucial for our analysis is only that information is not conveyed about relative locations on the other firm’s
product line. Concretely, a preference for Coke over Sprite can convey a likely preference for sodas over juices, but not
for Pepsi over Diet Pepsi. When we introduce such correlation in consumer preferences, and integrate the possibility
that some products are more costly to produce, we find that firms earn strictly positive profits as long as preferences
are not perfectly positively correlated. In this situation, sometimes a firm’s inexpensive product line competes against
itself for some consumers, rather than against the other firm’s expensive product line; this reduces the incentives to
over-provide products, reducing the intensity of price competition, and allowing firms to earn strictly positive profits.
1.7 Chapter 1 Proofs
Calculating yji(dj , SA, SB): Define
aji(Sj) = min{lji − aji−1,i(Sj), aji,i+1(Sj)− lji},
aji(Sj) = max{lji − aji−1,i(Sj), aji,i+1(Sj)− lji},
for i ∈ Nj , j ∈ {A,B}. aji(Sj) and aji(Sj) are the shortest and longest distances from franchise ji’s i location to
the edge of their service area.
Given strategies (SA, SB) and location shock dj in franchise ji’s service area, the conditional expected demand
yji(dj , SA, SB) is the measure of firm−j’s circle for which the total delivery cost of the product is lower if purchased
from franchise ji than from the lowest competing alternative. For a given d−j this lowest competing alternative is
identified by the partition of firm −j’s circle into franchise service areas. For some −jk franchises, total delivery cost
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by −jk to any point in its service area is lower than total delivery cost by franchise ji to dj . For some −jk franchises,
total delivery cost by −jk to any point in its service area is higher than total delivery cost by franchise ji to dj . The
remaining −jk franchises ’split’ their service area. For distances close to l−jk total delivery cost by −jk is lower than
by franchise ji to dj , while for distances far away,total delivery cost by −jk is higher than by franchise ji to dj . To
reflect this, we partition N−j into four sets given dj , SA and SB :
Lji(dj , SA, SB) = {k ∈ N−j : p−jk + a−jk(S−j)T < pji + |dj − lji |T},
Mji(dj , SA, SB) = {k ∈ N−j : p−jk + a−jk(S−j)T < pji + |dj − lji |T < p−jk + a−jk(S−j)T},
Hji(dj , SA, SB) = {k ∈ N−j : p−jk < pji + |dj − lji |T < p−jk + a−jk(S−j)T},
Vji(dj , SA, SB) = {k ∈ N−j : pji + |dj − lji |T < p−jk}.
We use this notation to calculate yji(dA, SA, SB):
yji(dj , SA, SB) =
[
L−
∑
k∈Hji (dj ,SA,SB)
2
(
pji − p−jk
T
+ |dj − lji |
)
−
∑
k∈Mji (dj ,SA,SB)
(
pji − p−jk
T
+ |dj − lji |+ a−ji(S−j)
)
−
∑
k∈Lji (dj ,SA,SB)
(
a−jk(S−j) + a−jk(S−j)
)]
/L.
Calculating Yji(SA, SB): By definition,
Yji(SA, SB) =
∫ aji,i+1 (Sj)
aji−1,i (Sj)
yji(dj , SA, SB)ddj .
To prove some results we use a more explicit decomposition of Yji(SA, SB) that exploits the fact that Yji(SA, SB) is
the sum of trapeziums. Define
cjik = max{0, (p−jk − pji)/T} and cjik+n−j = max{0, (p−jk − pji)/T + a−jk,k+1 − l−jk}.
cjik is the distance from lji at which a consumer who receives the location shock pair, (dj , d−j) = (lji + cjik , l−jk)
is indifferent to purchasing from franchise ji or franchise −jk. cjik+n−j is the distance from lji at which a consumer
who receives the location shock pair, (dj , d−j) = (lji +cjik+n−j , a−jk,k+1) is indifferent to purchasing from franchise
ji or franchise −jk. We reorder cjik so that cjik < cjik+1 . Let kji = |{k : cjik < aji,i+1 − lji}| and kji = |{jik :
19
cjik < lji − aji−1,i}|. Finally, let cji0 = 0, ckji+1 = aji,i+1 − lji and ckji+1 = lji − aji−1,i . Hence,
Yji(SA, SB) =
1
L
(kji+1∑
k=1
T (cjik , cjik−1 , yji(lji − cjik , SA, SB), yji(lji − cjik−1 , SA, SB))
+
kji+1∑
k=1
T (cjik , cjik−1 , yji(lji + cjik , SA, SB), yji(lji + cjik−1 , SA, SB))
)
, (1.7)
where T (a, b, c, d) = (a − b)(c + d)/2. Figure 1.5 is a graphical depiction of Yji . Yji is equal to the area under
yji(dj , SA, SB) from aji−1,i to aji,i+1 .
dj
yjk
1
yji−1(·)
yji(·)
yji+1(·)
aji−1,i aji,i+1lji
yji(·)
aˆji−1,i aˆji,i+1
lˆji
∆
2 ∆
Figure 1.5: Effect of a marginal shift in the location of franchise ji by ∆ from lji to lˆji . The dark gray trapeziums on
the left represent the increased demand for franchises ji−1 and ji. The light gray trapeziums on the right represent the
decreased demand for franchises ji and ji+1.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider franchise ji, such that yji(aji,i+1(Sj), SA, SB) = 0 and franchise jk such that
yjk(ajk−1,k(Sj), SA, SB) > 0, where i < k. Then fixing prices and shifting {ljm}k−1m=i+1 marginally by the same
amount counterclockwise, no franchise experiences a fall in market share (at least to a first order effect), but the
market shares (sales) of franchises jk−1 and jk both strictly increase. Hence, firm j’s profits must increase.
Suppose instead, yji(aji,i+1(Sj), SA, SB) > 0 and yjk(ajk−1,k(Sj), SA, SB) = 0. Then fixing prices and shifting
{ljm}k−1m=i+1 marginally by the same amount clockwise, no franchise experiences a fall in market share, but the market
shares of franchises ji and ji+1 strictly increase. Hence, firm j’s profits must increase. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Because each firm j franchise is isolated, each firm j franchise faces the same demand curve. It
follows that charging the same price at each franchise, and hence capturing the same market share is a best response.
To prove uniqueness, we show that Πj(SA, SB) is strictly quasi-concave in pji ∀i ∈ Nj , implying that this best
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response is unique.
Note that yji(dj , SA, SB) is a continuous, piecewise linear function of pji and lji ; since Yji(SA, SB) is the integral
of yji(dj , SA, SB), Yji(SA, SB) is C
1 as a function of {pji , lj1}nji=1.
The marginal profit function of firm j is differentiable with respect to pji and lji everywhere except at prices and
locations where the partition of firm −j franchises defined by L(.), M(.), H(.) and V (.) changes. At these points the
number of firm −j franchises against which franchise ji competes changes discontinuously.
Because franchise ji is isolated, yji(aji−1,i(Sj), SA, SB) = 0. If pji ≤ min{p−jk}, then yji(lji , SA, SB) = 1 and
marginal profit decreases linearly—the coefficient on pji is −4/(LT ). Hence, marginal profit is strictly decreasing
over this range. If pji > min{p−jk}, then yji(lji , SA, SB) < 1 and the marginal profit function is a series of
piecewise quadratic convex functions of pji over this range—the leading term coefficient is (2|Hji(lji , SA, SB)| +
|Mji(lji , SA, SB)|)/(2L2T 2). Within each section, the number of competing −j franchises remains constant. Each
section of the piecewise quadratic function has two real solutions over the domain of R+ (else profit can increase
without bound). The larger root of the quadratic in each section is where the implied franchise ji market share is 0.
Hence, the marginal profit function has only one root associated with a maximum. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Fix an arbitrary franchise profile, S−j for the other firm, and consider a franchise profile for firm
j with nj franchises. By fixing the prices and locations of the other firm j franchises we can analyze the impact of a
marginal shift in lji and pji . Using equation (1.7),
∂pij
∂lji
= pji−1
∂Yji−1
∂lji
+ pji
∂Yji
∂lji
+ pji+1
∂Yji+1
∂lji
=
pji−1
L
∂T (ckji−1+1
, ckji−1
, yji(lji−1 − ckji−1+1, SA, SB), yji−1(lji−1 − ckji−1 , SA, SB))
∂lji
+
pji
L
(
∂T (ckji+1
, ckji
, yji(lji − ckji+1, SA, SB), yji(lji − ckji , SA, SB))
∂lji
+
∂T (ckji+1
, ckji
, yji(lji − ckji+1, SA, SB), yji(lji − ckji , SA, SB))
∂lji
)
+
pji+1
L
∂T (ckji+1+1
, ckji+1
, yji+1(lji+1 − ckji+1+1, SA, SB), yji+1(lji+1 − ckji+1 , SA, SB))
∂lji
.
As Figure 1.5 shows, this is equal to
yji(aji−1,i(Sj), SA, SB)(pji + pji−1)− yji(aji,i+1(Sj), SA, SB)(pji + pji+1)
2L
. (1.8)
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Similarly,
∂pij
∂lji
= Yji + pji−1
∂Yji−1
∂pji
+ pji
∂Yji
∂pji
+ pji+1
∂Yji+1
∂pji
= Yji +
pji−1
L
∂T (ckji−1+1
, ckji−1
, yji−1(lji−1 − ckji−1+1, SA, SB), yji−1(lji−1 − ckji−1 , SA, SB))
∂pji
+
pji
L
(
∂T (ckji+1
, ckji
, yji(lji − ckji+1, SA, SB), yji(lji − ckji , SA, SB))
∂pji
+
∂T (c1, c0, yji(lji − c1, SA, SB), yji(lji − c0, SA, SB))
∂pji
+
∂T (c1, c0, yji(lji − c1, SA, SB), yji(lji − c0, SA, SB))
∂pji
+
∂T (ckji+1
, ckji
, yji(lji − ckji+1, SA, SB), yji(lji − ckji , SA, SB))
∂lji
)
+
pji+1
L
∂T (ckji+1+1
, ckji+1
, yji+1(lji+1 − ckji+1+1, SA, SB), yji+1(lji+1 − ckji+1 , SA, SB))
∂lji+1
.
As Figure 1.6 shows, this is equal to
Yji(SA, SB)− 2pji
yji(lji , SA, SB)
LT
+
yji(aji−1,i(Sj), SA, SB)(pji−1 + pji) + yji(aji,i+1(Sj), SA, SB)(pji+1 + pji)
2LT
. (1.9)
For Sj to be a best response to S−j (fixing nj), equations (1.8) and (1.9) evaluated at (Sj , S−j) must be zero. Since
by assumption no firm j franchise is isolated, this gives 2nj − 1 equations in 2nj − 1 unknowns.5 Inspection reveals
that uniform franchise pricing and equal distances between franchises solves this system of equations.
An extensive numerical analysis indicates that this symmetric solution is the globally optimal best response. We
compute firm j’s best response of location and price given the strategy of firm−j and the number of firm j franchises.
Using Lemma 2, we restrict firm −j strategies to those that charge a uniform price p−j at each franchise, where
p−j ∈ [0, 0.1, . . . , 100]. Without loss of generality we assume firm −j spaces its franchises equally (expected sales
of the other firm do not depend on the spacing of local monopolies).
Best responses are calculated for nj ∈ {2, . . . , 25} and n−j ∈ {2, . . . , 25} using the numerical optimization
algorithm “fmincon” in Matlab. The constraints associated with the algorithm are set to ensure that firm locations
are sequentially ordered, each franchise serves a non-negative measure of consumers and prices are non-negative.
We normalize
√
LT to 100. For each nj , for each competing firm strategy, equidistant franchise spacing and equal
franchise pricing are always the unique best response. 
5lj1 is normalized to 0.
22
dj
yjk
1
yji−1(·)
yji(·) yji(·)
yji+1(·)
aji−1,i aji,i+1lji
aˆji−1,i aˆji,i+1
∆
2T
∆
T
Figure 1.6: The effect of a marginal increase in the price charged by franchise ji by ∆ from pji to pˆji . The light gray
rectangles represent a loss in demand for franchise ji. The darker gray trapeziums represent a gain in demand for
franchise ji. The lighter gray trapeziums represent a gain in demand for franchises ji−1 and ji+1.
Proof of Lemma 4: First note that the marginal change in demand for firm B due to a change in pB is the same as the
marginal change in demand for firm A due to a change in pA. To see this, let pd = pA − pB . Then
∂YA
∂pA
=
∂YA
∂pd
=
∂(1− YB)
∂pd
= −∂YB
∂pd
=
∂YB
∂pB
. (1.10)
The first-order conditions for profit maximization of each firm with respect to its price gives
Y ∗A = −p∗A
∂Y ∗A
∂p∗A
and Y ∗B = −p∗B
∂Y ∗B
∂p∗B
. (1.11)
Combining equations (1.10) and (1.11) gives
Y ∗A
Y ∗B
=
p∗A
p∗B
.
Hence, p∗A ≥ p∗B ⇔ Y ∗A ≥ Y ∗B . It remains to show that in equilibrium firm B franchises are isolated. In contradiction
to the hypothesis, suppose that firm B franchises are not isolated, i.e., L/(2n∗B) < (p
∗
A − p∗B)/T + L/(2n∗A). Then
equation (1.5) and Y ∗B = 1− Y ∗A implies
Y ∗A =
n∗A
2n∗B
(
1− 2n∗B
p∗A − p∗B
LT
)2
<
n∗A
2n∗B
min
{
1,
n∗
2
B
n∗2A
}
= min
{ n∗A
2n∗B
,
n∗B
2n∗A
}
≤ 1/2 < Y ∗B . 
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Proof of Proposition 1: The first-order condition for firm A profit maximization with respect to nA is
∂piA
∂nA
=
pAnB
2n2A
− F = 0.
Hence,
p∗A =
2Fn∗
2
A
n∗B
. (1.12)
The first-order condition for firm B profit maximization with respect to pB is
∂piB
∂pB
= YB − 2pBnB
LT
=
nB
2nA
+ 2nB
pA − 2pB
LT
= 0,
where we substitute for YB using equation (1.4). Substituting for p∗A using equation (1.12) yields
p∗B =
Fn∗
2
A
n∗B
+
LT
8n∗A
. (1.13)
The first-order condition for firm A profit maximization with respect to pA is
∂piA
∂pA
= YA − 2pAnB
LT
= 1− nB
2nA
− 2nB 2pA − pB
LT
= 0, (1.14)
where we have substituted for YA using equaiton (1.3). Substituting for pA and pB using equations (1.12) and (1.13)
into equation (1.14) then yields
n∗B = 4n
∗
A(LT − 6Fn∗
2
A )/LT. (1.15)
The first-order condition for firm B profit maximization with respect to nB is
∂piB
∂nB
=
pBYB
nB
− F = 0. (1.16)
Hence, equations (1.12), (1.13), (1.15) and (1.16) imply that in equilibrium
(LT − 8Fn∗2A )(144F 2n∗
4
A − 32Fn∗
2
A LT + L
2T 2)
32n∗2A (LT − 6Fn∗2A )
= 0.
Solving yields
n∗A = n
∗
B =
1
2
√
LT
2F
,
which implies that
p∗A = p
∗
B =
√
FLT
2
.
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Hence, in the unique equilibrium pi∗A = pi
∗
B = 0.
6 The equilibrium is unique because firm profit is continuously
differentiable everywhere in price and franchise concentration and the above analysis shows only one possible solution
to the first-order conditions. 
Proof of Proposition 2: In equilibrium either LB/(2n∗B) ≥ LA/(2n∗A) + (p∗A − p∗B − a)/T or LB/(2n∗B) <
LA/(2n
∗
A) + (p
∗
A − p∗B − a)/T . This implies that in equilibrium at least one firm’s representative franchise is an
isolated franchise (if we have equality then all franchises are isolated). As in the previous proof, the scalability of
franchise concentration then immediately implies that this firm’s profits must be zero. 
Proof of Proposition 3: As in a symmetric firm setting, letting pd = pA − pB , we have
∂YA
∂pA
=
∂(1− YB)
∂pd
= −∂YB
∂pd
=
∂YB
∂pB
. (1.17)
Profit maximization implies
Y ∗A = −p∗A
∂Y ∗A
∂p∗A
and Y ∗B = −(p∗B − cB)
∂Y ∗B
∂p∗B
. (1.18)
Combining equations (1.17) and (1.18) gives
Y ∗A
Y ∗B
=
p∗A
p∗B − cB
Hence, p∗A ≥ p∗B − cB ⇔ Y ∗A ≥ Y ∗B .
Assume that p∗A > p
∗
B+a and LB/(2n
∗
B) > LA/(2n
∗
A)+(p
∗
A−p∗B−a)/T (we show later that these assumptions
hold in equilibrium). Firm profits are
piA = pAYA − nAFA = pA
(
1− LAnB
2LBnA
+ 2nB
pB − pA + a
LBT
)
− nAFA
piB = (pB − cB)YB − nBFB = (pB − cB)
(
LAnB
2LBnA
− 2nB pB − pA + a
LBT
)
− nBFB .
The four first-order conditions are
∂piA
∂pA
= YA − 2nBpA
LBT
= 0 (1.19)
∂piA
∂nA
=
LAnBpA
2LBn2A
− FA = 0 (1.20)
∂piB
∂pB
= YB − 2nB pB − cB
LBT
= 0 (1.21)
∂piB
∂nB
= YB
pB − cB
nB
− FB = 0. (1.22)
6The assumption that all consumers purchase the good implies that V ≥
√
9FLT
2
.
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The first-order condition for firm B profit maximization with respect to its franchise concentration immediately im-
plies that firm B earns zero profits. Solving equation (1.22) for Y ∗B =
n∗BFB
p∗B−cB and substituting into equation (1.21),
we solve for
p∗B =
√
FBLBT
2
+ cB . (1.23)
From equation (1.20) we get
p∗A =
2FALBn
∗2
A
LAn∗B
. (1.24)
Substituting Y ∗A = 1− Y ∗B = 1− n
∗
BFB
p∗B−cB into equation (1.19), gives
1− n
∗
BFB
p∗B − cB
=
2n∗Bp
∗
A
LBT
.
Substituting for p∗A using equation (1.24) and p
∗
B using equation (1.23), we solve for
n∗B =
LALBT − 4FALBn∗2A
LA
√
2FBLBT
. (1.25)
Substituting equations (1.23), (1.24) and (1.25) into equation (1.19), reveals that nA is given by the solution to a cubic
equation,
G(nA) = −8FA(2α+ 3β)n3A + 4FALATn2A + 4LAT (α+ β)nA − L2AT 2,
where α = a+cB and β =
√
2FBLBT . Because the discriminant ofG(nA) is positive,G(nA) has 3 real roots. Also,
since the leading term coefficient is negative and G(0) = −L2AT 2 < 0, G has at least one negative root. To be consis-
tent with our initial premise that LB/(2n∗B) > LA/(2n
∗
A)+(p
∗
A−p∗B−a)/T , we must have n∗A > LAT/(2(α+β)).
G(nA) evaluated at this lower bound is positive, implying that such a solution exists and n∗A is the largest root of
G(nA). Define
nA =
√
LAT (2α+ β)
8FA(α+ β)
and nA =
√
LAT (α+ β)
2FA(2α+ 3β)
.
Evaluating G at these points yields
G(nA) =
T 2β(
√
FB
√
2α+ β −√FA
√
α+ β)
2
√
FA
√
(α+ β)3
> 0 and G(nA) = − LAT
2β
2α+ 3β
< 0.
Hence, nA < n
∗
A < nA. We now show that p
∗
A > p
∗
B + a. Using equations (1.23), (1.24) and (1.25) this is equivalent
to showing
8FAn
∗2
A (α+ β)− LAT (2α+ β)
2(LAT − 4FAnA∗2) > 0,
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which holds since nA < n
∗
A < nA.
Uniqueness is assured by showing that p∗A > p
∗
B + a and LB/(2n
∗
B) > LA/(2n
∗
A) + (p
∗
A− p∗B − a)/T must hold
in equilibrium. To see this consider the three other possible outcomes.
Case 1: p∗A > p∗B + a, LB/(2n∗B) ≤ LA/(2n∗A) + (p∗A − p∗B − a)/T . Let
X∗ =
LB
2n∗B
−
(
p∗A − p∗B − a
T
)
< min
{
LA
2n∗A
,
LB
2n∗B
}
.
Y ∗A =
2n∗An
∗
BX
∗2
LALB
<
2n∗An
∗
B
LALB
(
min
{
LA
2n∗A
,
LB
2n∗B
})2
= min
{
n∗BLA
2n∗ALB
,
n∗ALB
2n∗BLA
}
< 1/2 < Y ∗B .
but this implies p∗A < (p
∗
B − cB) which contradicts p∗A > p∗B + a.
Case 2: p∗A ≤ p∗B + a, LB/(2n∗B) ≥ LA/(2n∗A) + (p∗A − p∗B − a)/T . Let
X∗ =
LA
2n∗A
+
(
p∗A − p∗B − a
T
)
< min
{
LA
2n∗A
,
LB
2n∗B
}
.
Demand for firm B is
Y ∗B =
2n∗An
∗
BX
∗2
LALB
<
2n∗An
∗
B
LALB
(
min
{
LA
2n∗A
,
LB
2n∗B
})2
= min
{
n∗BLA
2n∗ALB
,
n∗ALB
2n∗BLA
}
< 1/2 < Y ∗A.
Hence, from lemma 4, p∗A > p
∗
B − cB . The four first-order conditions are
∂piA
∂pA
= 1− YB − 2pAYB
XT
= 0 (1.26)
∂piB
∂pB
= YB
(
1− 2(pB − cB)
XT
)
= 0 (1.27)
∂piA
∂nA
=
pAYB
nA
(
LA
nAX
− 1
)
− FA = 0 (1.28)
∂piB
∂nB
=
(pB − cB)YB
nB
− FB = 0. (1.29)
Combining equations (1.26), (1.27) and YA = 1− YB yields
Y ∗A =
p∗A
p∗A + p
∗
B − cB
and Y ∗B =
p∗B − cB
p∗A + p
∗
B − cB
. (1.30)
The first-order condition for firm B profit maximization with respect to its price implies
X∗ =
2(p∗B − cB)
T
. (1.31)
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Substituting equation (1.31) into Y ∗B gives
Y ∗B =
8n∗An
∗
B(p
∗
B − cB)2
LALBT 2
. (1.32)
Substituting for Y ∗B using equation (1.32) into equation (1.29) we solve for
n∗A =
FBLALBT
2
8(p∗B − cB)3
. (1.33)
Using the definition of X∗ and equation (1.31) gives
LA/(2n
∗
A) + (p
∗
A − p∗B − a)/T =
2(p∗B − cB)
T
.
Because p∗A ≤ p∗B + a this further implies that p∗B ≥ cB +
√
FBLBT
2 . Finally, substituting equations (1.30), (1.31)
and (1.33) into equation (1.28) implies
8p∗A(p
∗
B − cB)4(4(p∗B − cB)2 − FBLBT )− (p∗A + p∗B − cB)FALAF 2BL2BT 3 = 0.
This equality can never be satisfied since p∗A > p
∗
B − cB and p∗B ≥ c+
√
FBLBT
2 .
Case 3: p∗A ≤ p∗B + a, LB/(2n∗B) ≤ LA/(2n∗A) + (p∗A − p∗B − a)/T The second assumption implies that firm
A franchises are isolated, so that firm A makes zero profit. This combined with the first assumption imply that
n∗A < n
∗
B . If Y
∗
A ≥ 1/2 ≥ Y ∗B then p∗A > p∗B − cB , which implies firm B makes negative profit. Conversely if,
instead, Y ∗A < 1/2 < Y
∗
B , then there exists a deviation by firm A that gives it positive profit, contradicting the posited
equilibrium. To see this, observe that firm A’s demand is
Y ∗A =
LBn
∗
A
2LAn∗B
+ 2n∗A
p∗B + a− p∗A
LAT
< 1/2 implying that
LBn
∗
A
LAn∗B
< 1. (1.34)
Profit maximization by firm B requires that in equilibrium
∂piB
∂nB
= (pB − cB) LBnA
2LAn2B
− FB = 0. (1.35)
Substituting the inequality in equation (1.34) into (1.35) reveals that p
∗
B−cB
2 > n
∗
BFB . If firm A deviates and sets
pA = p
∗
B + a and nA = n
∗
B , then YA = 1/2 and its profit is strictly positive. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Let firms 1 to N − 1 employ symmetric strategies, p1 = . . . = pN−1 = p and n1 = . . . =
nN−1 = n. One can again show that for firm N to charge a lower markup price than the other firms in equilibrium,
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N must serve a smaller share of the market. Hence, if pN ≤ p, then YN ≥ Y . Firm N ’s market share is
YN = (N − 1)!2
NnNn
N−1
LN
(∫ p−pN
T
0
∫ L
2n
0
∫ L
2n
dN−1
. . .
∫ L
2n
d2
1dd1 . . . ddN
+
∫ L
2n+
p−pN
T
p−pN
T
∫ L
2n
dN− p−pNT
∫ L
2n
dN−1
. . .
∫ L
2n
d2
1dd1 . . . ddN
)
=
nN
Nn
+
2nN (p− pN )
LT
.
Hence,
piN = pN
(
nN
Nn
+
2nN (p− pN )
LT
)
− FnN .
The first-order condition for firm N with respect to nN is
dpiN
dnN
= pN
YN
nN
− F = 0.
Hence, pi∗N = pNYN − FnN = 0. In a symmetric equilibrium YN = 1N , so that
pN = FNnN . (1.36)
The first-order condition for firm N with respect to pN is
dpiN
dpN
= −pN 2nN
LT
+ YN = 0. (1.37)
Substituting YN = 1N and solving equations (1.36) and (1.37) simultaneously yields p
∗
N =
√
FLT
2 and n
∗
N =
1
N
√
LT
2F . 
Proof of Proposition 5: In the second stage, firm i maximizes pii given franchise concentrations, nA = nB = n and
the prices of the other firm j. With nA = nB , it is straightforward to show that firms choose pA = pB . But then prices
drop out of the social planner’s objective,
SS = V − 4n
2
L2
∫ L
2n
0
(∫ L
2n
dA
TdAddB +
∫ dA
0
TdBddB
)
ddA − 2nF
= V − LT
6n
− 2nF. (1.38)
Differentiating SS with respect to n gives the social planner’s first-order condition:7
∂SS
∂n
=
LT
6n2SP
− 2F = 0.
7Second-order conditions are clearly satisfied.
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Denoting the optimal level of franchise concentration per firm as n∗SP , we solve for
n∗SP =
√
LT
12F
<
√
LT
8F
= n∗,
SS∗SP = V −
√
4FLT
3
> V −
√
25FLT
18
= SS∗. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Case 1 (smallm). We first consider the possibility thatm is small enough that in equilibrium
no consumer with location shocks {dj , d−j} = { L2nj , 0}, j ∈ {A,B} purchases from firm j, i.e., m < |p∗A − p∗B | +
T max{ L2n∗A ,
L
2n∗B
}. That is, m is small enough that, in equilibrium, any consumer who is located at the same point as
one firm’s franchise and at the edge of the other firm’s franchise service area will patronize the former firm regardless
of their taste preference. Under this assumption, firm market shares are
YA =
2nAnB
mL2
[∫ L
2nA
0
∫ L
2nB
0
(∫ T
2nA
+pA−pB
(dA−dB)T+pA−pB
dz −
∫ T
2nA
+pA−pB
m
dz
)
ddBddA
+
∫ L
2nA
pB−pA+m
T
∫ dA+ pA−pB−mT
0
∫ (dA−dB)T+pA−pB
m
dzddBddA
−
∫ L
2nB
+
pB−pA−m
T
0
∫ L
2nB
dA+
pA−pB+m
T
∫ −m
(dA−dB)T+pA−pB
dzddAddB
]
YB =
2nAnB
mL2
[∫ L
2nA
0
∫ L
2nB
0
(∫ (dA−dB)T+pA−pB
− T2nB +pB−pA
dz −
∫ −m
− T2nB +pB−pA
dz
)
ddBddA
+
∫ L
2nB
+
pB−pA−m
T
0
∫ L
2nB
dA+
pA−pB+m
T
∫ −m
(dA−dB)T+pA−pB
dzddAddB
−
∫ L
2nA
pB−pA+m
T
∫ dA+ pA−pB−mT
0
∫ (dA−dB)T+pA−pB
m
dzddBddA
]
.
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Simplifying yields
YA =
nAnB
24m
{
3LT (nA + nB)
n2An
2
B
+
12nA(pB − pA +m)− 6LT
n2AnB
+
1
L2T 2
[(
2nB(pA − pB +m)− LT
nB
)3
−
(
2nA(pB − pA +m)− LT
nA
)3]}
YB =
nAnB
24m
{
3LT (nA + nB)
n2An
2
B
+
12nB(pA − pB +m)− 6LT
nAn2B
− 1
L2T 2
[(
2nB(pA − pB +m)− LT
nB
)3
−
(
2nA(pB − pA +m)− LT
nA
)3]}
.
Differentiating firm profit and applying symmetry yields the equilibrium outcomes:
p∗A = p
∗
B = p
∗
mS =
2FLT√
8FLT −m and n
∗
A = n
∗
B = n
∗
mS =
1
2
√
LT
2F
.
Our initial assumption that m < |p∗A − p∗B |+ T max{ L2n∗A ,
L
2n∗B
} holds if and only if m < √2FLT . In equilibrium,
pi∗A = pi
∗
B =
m
√
2FLT
4(
√
8FLT −m) > 0, since m <
√
2FLT . (1.39)
The second-order conditions when m is small are ∂2pii∂p2i ∂2pii∂pi∂ni
∂2pii
∂pi∂ni
∂2pii
∂n2i

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣nA=nB=n∗mS
pA=pB=p
∗
mS
=
 m−2ββ2 2mβ−m2−2β22LT (m−2β)
2mβ−m2−2β2
2LT (m−2β)
8F 2
m−2β
 .
Hence, we have a maximum since the matrix is negative definite.
Case 2 (large m). If m >
√
2FLT , then in equilibrium some consumers who realize location shocks {dj , d−j} =
{ L2nj , 0}, j ∈ {A,B} still purchase from firm j. In this case the market shares and profits of the two firms are given
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by
YA =
2nAnB
mL2
∫ L
2nA
0
∫ L
2nB
0
∫ m
T (dA−dB)+pA−pB
dzddBddA
=
1
2
+
pB − pA
2m
+
LT
m
(
1
8nB
− 1
8nA
)
YB =
2nAnB
mL2
∫ L
2nA
0
∫ L
2nB
0
∫ T (dA−dB)+pA−pB
−m
dzddBddA
=
1
2
+
pA − pB
2m
+
LT
m
(
1
8nA
− 1
8nB
)
piA(SA, SB) =
(
1
2
+
pB − pA
2m
+
LT
m
[
1
8nB
− 1
8nA
])
pA − nAF
piB(SA, SB) =
(
1
2
+
pA − pB
2m
+
LT
m
[
1
8nA
− 1
8nB
])
pB − nBF.
Differentiating firm profit and applying symmetry yields the equilibrium outcomes:
p∗A = p
∗
B = p
∗
mL = m and n
∗
A = n
∗
B = n
∗
mL =
1
2
√
LT
2F
, so that
pi∗A = pi
∗
B =
1
2
(
m−
√
FLT
2
)
> 0. (1.40)
The second-order conditions are ∂2pii∂p2i ∂2pii∂pi∂ni
∂2pii
∂pi∂ni
∂2pii
∂n2i

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣nA=nB=n∗mL
pA=pB=p
∗
mL
=
− 1m Fm
F
m −4
√
2F 3
LT
 .
Hence, we have a maximum since the matrix is negative definite. 
Proof of Proposition 7: In an environment with heterogeneity only in consumer tastes, firm i captures (m − pi +
pj)/(2m) of the market. Firm i then maximizes
max
pi
pi
(pj − pi +m)
2m
.
Differentiating with respect to pi and imposing symmetry yields p∗NT = m and profit pi
∗
NT = m/2. This profit exceed
profits when there is both taste and spatial consumer heterogeneity, given by equation (1.40) when m ≤ √2FLT , and
by equation (1.39) when m >
√
2FLT . 
Proof of Proposition 8: First we assume that ρ, F1 and F2 are such that Y12 > 0. There are four possible cases:
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1. p1 ≤ p2 and ( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T )− L2n1 ≤ 0.
2. p1 ≥ p2 and ( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T )− L2n1 ≤ 0.
3. p1 ≤ p2 and ( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T )− L2n1 > 0.
4. p1 ≥ p2 and ( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T )− L2n1 > 0.
We will rule out the latter two possibilities (which would imply that even though F1 > F2, firms make zero profits
from circle 2, but positive profits from circle 1). We present case 1 in detail; analyses of the other three cases are
similar.
Case 1: In the neighborhood of an equilibrium with pAi ≥ pBi , i = 1, 2, we have
piB =pB1
(
ρ
(
1− 4nA1nB1
L2
∫ L
2nA1
0
∫ L
2nB1
dA1+
pA1
−pB1
T
ddB1 ddA1
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
1− 4nA2nB1
L2
∫ L
2nA2
0
∫ L
2nB1
dA2+
pA2
−pB1
T
ddB1 ddA2
))
+ pB2
(
(1− ρ)4nA1nB2
L2
∫ L
2nB2
0
∫ L
2nA1
dB2+
pB2
−pA1
T
ddA1 ddB2
+ ρ
(
1− 4nA2nB2
L2
∫ L
2nA2
0
∫ L
2nB2
dA2+
pA2
−pB2
T
ddB2 ddA2
))
− (F1nB1 + F2nB2) .
The first-order conditions for firm B are
∂piB
∂pB1
= ρ
(
YB11 −
2pB1nB1
LT
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
YB12 −
2pB1nB1
LT
)
= 0
∂piB
∂pB2
= ρ
(
YB22 −
2pB2nB2
LT
)
+ (1− ρ)
(
YB21 −
2pB2nA1
LT
)
= 0
∂piB
∂nB1
= ρYB11
pB1
nB1
+ (1− ρ)YB12
pB1
nB1
− F1 = 0
∂piB
∂nB2
=
(1− ρ)nA1pB2
2n2B2
+ ρYB22
pB2
nB2
− F2 = 0.
where we have substituted nA12nB2 = YB21 +
(
pB2
−pA1
T
)
+ L2nB2
− L2nA1
L
2nA1
in ∂piB∂nB2 . Imposing symmetry, substituting
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Yjj =
1
2 and rearranging the first-order conditions yields:
0 =
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y12 − 2p1n1
LT
(1.41)
0 =
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y21 − 2p2
LT
(ρn2 + (1− ρ)n1) (1.42)
0 = p1
(ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y12
)
− F1n1 (1.43)
0 = p2
(
(1− ρ) n1
2n2
+
ρ
2
)
− F2n2. (1.44)
We see immediately from equation (1.43) that firms earn zero profits on circle 1, and from equation (1.44) that firms
earn strictly positive profits on circle 2 when (p2−p1T ) +
L
2n2
− L2n1 < 0 (which implies that n12n2 < Y21). Using
equation (1.43) to substitute for
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y12 = F1n1
p1
into (1.41) and solving for p1 yields
p1 =
√
LTF1
2
.
Also, n1 and n2 solve
2
√
2
√
LTF1n1 − LTρ
(1− ρ) =
n1
n2
(
LT + 4n2
(
4F2n
2
2
2[(1− ρ)n1 + ρn2] −
√
LTF1√
2
))
(1.45)
LT −
√
2
√
LTF1n1 = 4F2n
2
2. (1.46)
Solving equation (1.46) for n1 and substituting into equation (1.45) yields
2LT (1− ρ2 )− 8F2n22
(1− ρ) =
(
LT − 4F2n22
)
√
2
√
(LTF1)n2
(
LT + 4n2
(
4F2n
2
2
2ρn2 +
√
2(1−ρ)
(
LT−4F2n22
)
√
LTF1
−
√
LTF1√
2
))
,
which can be reduced to the following fifth-degree polynomial equation:
64F 22F1(1− ρ)(3− ρ)n52 + 16F2
√
2
√
F1LT ((F2 − F1)(2− ρ)ρ− F2)n42 − 16F2F1LT (1− ρ)(5− 3ρ)n32
+ 2LT
√
2
√
F1LT (4F2(1− ρ)2 + ρF1(4− 3ρ))n22 + 8L2T 2F1(1− ρ)2n2 − L2T 2
√
2
√
F1LT (1− ρ)2 = 0.
Analogously, one can solve for the first-order conditions for the other three cases:
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Case 2. p1 ≥ p2 and ( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T )− L2n1 ≤ 0
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y12 = 2p1
LT
(
ρn1 + (1− ρ)n2
( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T )
L
2n1
)
(1.47)
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y21 = 2p2n2
LT
(
ρ+ (1− ρ) (
L
2n2
− p1−p2T )
L
2n1
)
(1.48)
ρp1
2
+ (1− ρ)p1Y12 − F1n1 = 0 (1.49)
ρp2
2
+ (1− ρ)p2Y21 − F2n2 = (1− ρ)p2
( L2n1 − ( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T ))
L
2n1
. (1.50)
Case 3. p1 ≤ p2 and ( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T )− L2n1 ≥ 0.
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y12 = 2p1n1
LT
(
ρ+ (1− ρ) (
L
2n1
− p2−p1T )
L
2n2
)
(1.51)
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y21 = 2p2
LT
(
ρn2 + (1− ρ)n1
( L2n1 −
p2−p1
T )
L
2n2
)
(1.52)
ρp1
2
+ (1− ρ)p1Y12 − F1n1 = (1− ρ)p1
( L2n2 − ( L2n1 −
p2−p1
T t))
L
2n2
(1.53)
ρp2
2
+ (1− ρ)p2Y21 − F2n2 = 0. (1.54)
Case 4. p1 ≥ p2 and ( L2n2 −
p1−p2
T )− L2n1 ≥ 0.
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y12 = 2p1
LT
(ρn1 + (1− ρ)n2) (1.55)
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)Y21 = 2p2n2
LT
(1.56)
ρp1
2
+ (1− ρ)p1Y12 − F1n1 = (1− ρ)p1
((
L
2n2
− (p1−p2)T
)
− L2n1
)
L
2n2
(1.57)
ρp2
2
+ (1− ρ)p2Y21 − F2n2 = 0. (1.58)
Cases 1 and 4 are “symmetric”, as are Cases 2 and 3: relabeling p1 as p2, p2 as p1, n1 as n2 and n2 as n1 in Case
1, the sets of first-order conditions in Case 4 correspond to those in 1.
To rule out cases 3 and 4, we first characterize p1 relative to p2. We know that p1 > p2 at ρ = 1. As p1 =
√
F1LT
2
for p1 ≥ p2, the critical ρ that determines which price is higher sets p1 = p2 =
√
F1LT
2 . At p1 = p2, the first order
conditions (1.49) and (1.50) simplify to:
ρp1
2
+ (1− ρ) n1
2n2
p1 − F1n1 = 0 (1.59)
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(1− ρ)p1 n1
2n2
+
ρp1
2
− F2n2 = 0. (1.60)
Therefore, at p1 = p2, we have F1n1 = F2n2 ⇔ F1F2 = n2n1 .
In addition, the first-order conditions (1.47) and (1.48) are,
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ) n1
2n2
= p1
2n1
LT
(1.61)
ρ
2
+ (1− ρ)
(
1− n1
2n2
)
=
2p1
LT
(ρn2 + (1− ρ)n1), (1.62)
where p1 = p2 =
√
F1LT
2 . Substituting n2 = n1
F1
F2
and solving (1.61) for n1 yields
n1 =
√
LT (ρF1 + F2 − ρF2)
2
√
2F
3/2
1
, (1.63)
and solving (1.62) for n1 yields
n1 =
√
LTF2 (2F1 − ρF1 − F2 + ρF2)
2
√
2F
3/2
1 (ρF1 + F2 − ρF2)
. (1.64)
Equating these two solutions, we solve for
ρ∗ =
√
F2
√
8F1 + F2 − 3F2
2 (F1 − F2) . (1.65)
Differentiation establishes that ρ∗ is decreasing in F1, and an application of L’Hospital’s rule shows that ρ∗ → 23 as
F2 → F1.
We are now in a position to rule out Cases 3 and 4. First note that if F1 > F2, then when ρ = 0 or ρ = 1,
( L2n1 −
p2−p1
T ) − L2n2 > 0. Further, ( L2n1 −
p2−p1
T ) − L2n2 is continuous in ρ, so suppose there were a ρ such that
( L2n1 −
p2−p1
T )− L2n2 = 0. If p1 ≤ p2, as in Cases 1 and 3 then n2 ≥ n1 and Y12 ≥ Y21 = n12n2 . From the first-order
equations (1.51) and (1.52) for Case 3,
2p1n1
LT
≥ 1
2
≥ 2p2
LT
(ρn2 + (1− ρ)n1) ≥ 2p2n1
LT
.
But this implies that p1 = p2. By the assumption that ( L2n1 −
p2−p1
T )− L2n2 = 0, we have n1 = n2, thus F1 = F2 by
F1
F2
= n2n1 at p1 = p2, a contradiction. The analysis for Case 4 is similar. If p2 ≤ p1, as in Cases 2 and 4 then n1 ≥ n2
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and Y21 ≥ Y12. From the Case 4 first order equations (1.55) and (1.56),
2p2n2
LT
≥ 1
2
≥ 2p1
LT
(ρn1 + (1− ρ)n2) ≥ 2p1n2
LT
.
Again this implies that p1 = p2, and a contradiction obtains as above. Thus, we have that equilibrium is characterized
by Cases 1 and 2.
To show that n1 < n2, we show that n1 ≥ n2 implies a contradiction in Case 2. Under Case 2, p1 ≥ p2 and
Y21 ≥ Y12. If n1 ≥ n2 then from equations (1.47) and (1.48)
2p2n2
LT
(ρ+ (1− ρ)λ) ≥ 1
2
≥ 2p1
LT
(ρn1 + (1− ρ)n2λ) ≥ 2p1n2
LT
(ρ+ (1− ρ)λ),
where
λ =
2n1
L
(
L
2n2
− (p1 − p2)
T
)
.
Again this implies that p1 = p2. Thus, we have n1 > n2 and F1 > F2 at p1 = p2, which contradicts our finding that
F1
F2
= n2n1 at p1 = p2.
From (1.50), firm profit in Case 2 is
pi2 = (1− ρ)p2
(
L
2n1
−
(
L
2n2
− (p1−p2)T
))
L
2n1
= (1− ρ)p2
(
1− n1
n2
+
2n1 (p1 − p2)
LT
)
= (1− ρ)p2
(
1− n1
2n2
(
1− 4n2 (p1 − p2)
LT
+
4n22 (p1 − p2)2
L2T 2
)
− n1
2n2
+
2n1n2(p1 − p2)2
L2T 2
)
= (1− ρ)p2
(
Y21 − n1
2n2
+
2n1n2(p1 − p2)2
L2T 2
)
> (1− ρ)p2
(
Y21 − n1
2n2
)
,
where the third equality follows from rearranging, which allows us to write it in the form of the fourth equality, as in
equation (1.6) (where 1 replaces A and 2 replaces B).
Finally, we characterize equilibrium when Y12 = 0 and Y21 = 1. This is a special case of Case 2. From the
first-order conditions, one can solve explicitly for the equilibrium values:
n1 =
√
ρLT
8F1
, p1 =
√
F1LT
2ρ
, n2 =
√
(2− ρ)LT
8F2
, p2 =
√
(2− ρ)F2LT
2ρ2
and
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pi2 = (1− ρ)
√
(2− ρ)F2LT
2ρ2
.
Equilibrium is characterized by Y12 = 0 if F1 > 8F2 and
ρ ∈
[
F1 − 2F2 −
√
F 21 − 8F1F2
F1 + F2
,
F1 − 2F2 +
√
F 21 − 8F1F2
F1 + F2
]
.
Note that all results of Proposition 8 hold: n2 > n1, p1 > p2 for ρ > ρ∗ and pi2 = (1− ρ)p2. 
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Chapter 2
Do-Nothing Extremists and Protection
against the Tyranny of an Unrepresentative
Majority
2.1 Introduction
The effect of [a representative democracy is] to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of the nation....
James Madison
Society’s tastes for government policy vary as society itself changes. More often than not, the legislature comprised
of elected representatives takes the role of ensuring that changes in government policy reflect these changes in taste.
How easily this legislature can adapt policy to reflect tastes depends on the rules that govern the legislative process.
An unencumbered legislative process will ensure that policy closely reflects the preferences of the legislative
body. This will benefit society if the legislators’ preferences mirror those of society. However, for reasons such
as party affiliation, incumbency advantage, special interest group pressure, gerrymandered districts, imperfect voter
information, time between elections, and so on, an elected legislature may not well-represent society. In such instances,
a degree of inertia or legislative rigidity, as encapsulated in the proportion of legislative votes required to pass a
proposal, may protect society from a radical legislature’s desire to implement ‘bad’ policy.
Examples of supermajority rules in practice are commonplace. For example, the United States Constitution es-
tablishes supermajority rules for a range of decisions such as overriding vetoes, the United States Senate requires a
three-fifths majority to end a filibuster, and many states require supermajorities to raise taxes, pass spending bills, or
pass legislation that restricts local communities’ regulatory powers.
We develop a simple model of the legislative process to address the optimal tradeoff between flexibility and pro-
tection embedded in voting rules. Our model has three basic building blocks. First, society has quadratic preferences
over policy outcomes, and society’s preferred policy e may evolve from an established status quo. Second, while the
preferred policy m of the median legislator may reflect society’s new preferred policy in expectation, realizations of
preferred policies may differ. Third, there is a (possibly probabilistic) rule that selects a member of the legislature,
p, who gets to propose a policy. This policy is adopted if and only if it wins approval from a sufficient proportion
of the legislature in a vote against a status quo alternative. The proposer could, but need not always be, the median
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member of the legislature. In this setting, we characterize how the primitives of our economy affect the optimal degree
of inertia in the legislature, as captured by the proportion of votes necessary for a proposal to defeat the status quo.
Our model allows us to address fundamental questions. When is a simple majority optimal? How does increasing
the likelihood of ‘irresponsible’ legislatures—legislatures with a median whose preferred policy is far from society’s—
affect the optimal supermajority? How will selecting a proposer whose interests are further from the median legisla-
tor’s, and hence is less representative of society, affect the optimal supermajority? What is the impact of initial policy
bias?
When choosing a policy, a proposer faces one of three scenarios. First, a proposer can be free from legislative
constraint: he can propose his most preferred policy and win approval from enough legislators to defeat the status quo.
Second, he can be completely blocked from implementing a policy change that he prefers: there may be no policy that
the proposer both prefers to the status quo and would receive enough votes from legislators. In these two scenarios
where a proposer is free or blocked, marginal changes in the voting rule have no effect on policy outcomes.
In the third scenario, the proposer is constrained: he can only instigate a partial movement in policy toward his
bliss point. When the median legislator is conservative, i.e., when he lies close to the status quo, so do most legislators,
making it difficult or impossible for a proposer to identify a policy that enough legislators prefer to the status quo:
the voting rule severely constrains policy movement so that only small policy changes are possible, and the resulting
policy outcome is closer to the status quo than the representative citizen typically prefers. However, when, instead, the
median legislator is radical, i.e., when he lies far from the status quo, so do most legislators. As a result, the voting rule
lightly constrains policy movement, both for good and for bad. We establish a simple characterization of the optimal
voting rule whenever a supermajority is optimal: the optimal voting rule is such that conditional on the proposer being
constrained, the expected policy outcome equals the expected bliss point of the representative/median citizen. Quite
generally, neither submajority nor unanimity voting rules are ever optimal: submajorities facilitate unrepresentative
shifts in policy from the status quo, leading to excessive policy movement, while unanimity eliminates all movement
in policy, whereas a lesser, but still large supermajority would approve only policy changes that the representative
citizen strictly prefers.
We first focus on the case where the median legislator is always the proposer. The median is never constrained
by simple majority rule. Hence, simple majorities increase the representative citizen’s utility if the distance between
his bliss point, e and that of the median legislator m is less than that between e and the status quo. It follows directly
that if the legislature is sufficiently representative of society and the median legislator proposes policy, then it is not
optimal to constrain the legislature via a supermajority. In particular, if preferences in society are sufficiently variable
relative to the likely representativeness of the legislature, then simple majority is optimal.
But how unrepresentative must the legislature be before it is optimal to constrain the median proposer? We consider
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three broad classes of distributions over bliss points of the representative citizen and the median legislator: two-
point, uniform and normal. In all three classes, a supermajority becomes optimal even when legislative preferences
are less volatile than society’s. Moreover, when the volatility in the preferences of the median legislator around
the representative citizen’s preferred policy is sufficiently high vis a` vis the volatility in the representative citizen’s
preferred policy, the optimal supermajority rises with the volatility of the legislature’s preferences and falls with the
volatility of society’s preferences. The first-order intuition is that when the median legislator’s preferences are more
dispersed around the representative citizen’s preferred policy, the median legislator is more likely to want to implement
a “worse” policy. As a result, the social planner wants to constrain the median proposer further.
Importantly, slight supermajorities may never be optimal: for both two-point and uniform distributions, the optimal
voting rule is a discontinuous function of the underlying parameters moving from majority to supermajority. This
discontinuity reflects that supermajority voting rules are blunt instruments, restricting for good when the proposer is
radical and for bad when he is conservative. Quite generally, when the median legislator is close to the status quo,
supermajorities tend to constrain him excessively, and when he is far from the status quo, they tend to constrain him
too little. Slight supermajorities always tend to restrict the less radical proposers disproportionately by more. Thus,
the social planner’s consideration becomes (i) should he leave the median legislator unchecked via a simple majority
voting rule; or (ii) is the median legislator likely to be sufficiently unrepresentative that he should choose a large
supermajority, forsaking the gains that a conservative proposer can achieve in order to restrain extreme proposers via
large supermajorities? That is, slight supermajorities incur the costs of restricting conservative proposers significantly,
while providing limited beneficial restraint on extreme proposers.
One’s first-order intuition might suggest that greater volatility in the representative citizen’s preferred policy should
always reduce the optimal supermajority, as the status quo is likely to be further from his preferred policy, making
change more attractive. We show constructively, using a two-point distribution of e and m, that this need not be so.
A shift of e away from the status quo by one unit also shifts the distribution of m away from the status quo by one
unit, so the legislature has the freedom to change policy by up to two units. This increases the ratio of (a) constrained
proposers who move policy too far to (b) constrained proposers who move policy insufficiently; and can make greater
supermajorities optimal.
The conjecture that more volatile legislative preferences, which lead to more irresponsible median legislators vis a`
vis society, should always increase the optimal supermajority is also false. A mean preserving spread of the distribution
of the median legislator’s preferences can be created that (a) reduces the measure of blocked proposers (for whom the
size of the sufficient supermajority is irrelevant), and (b) increases the measure of heavily constrained proposers, who,
on average, generate insufficient movement in policy, but (c) leaves unaltered the measure of most radical proposers,
whom the social planner wants to constrain. Changing the measure of blocked proposers has no direct effect on the
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optimal voting rule. However, increasing the measure of heavily-constrained proposers, implies insufficient average
movement in policy. Thus, the optimal voting rule falls.
We then consider how the selection of the policy proposer affects the optimal voting rule. To focus on the “rep-
resentativeness” of a proposer, we consider proposers who are equally likely to lie distance up to the left or right of
the median legislator. An increase in this ‘polarity’ distance represents a more extreme proposer. One’s first-order
intuition might be that with more extreme proposers, greater supermajorities should be optimal because proposers
who are more extreme within the legislature also tend to be further from the representative citizen. Indeed, when the
legislature is highly polarized, this intuition is correct. A more extreme proposer who is constrained in his change of
legislative outcome indicates a median legislator and representative citizen whose bliss points lie closer to the status
quo. Increasing the supermajority reduces the policy movement away from the status quo and hence typically the
representative citizen.
But what is the effect of more extreme proposers on the size of the optimal voting rule when the legislature is
sufficiently unrepresentative that a supermajority is optimal, but the polarity of the proposer is is only modest? When
does making the proposer less representative of the legislature (i.e., increasing up) raise the optimal supermajority,
and when does it reduce it?
We establish that slight polarity reduces the optimal supermajority whenever the median legislator’s preferences
tend not to mirror the representative citizen’s. However, the relationship between polarity and the optimal superma-
jority is U-shaped. The intuition is that, on average, more extreme proposers like more extreme policies. However,
more extreme proposers are also more constrained than the median legislator by the necessity of winning approval
from more moderate representatives. As the dispersion of the median legislator around the representative citizen’s
bliss point rises, conditional on legislative success, it is more likely that a more extreme proposer shifts policy in
the direction that society prefers. In contrast, a greater supermajority is required to protect against a rogue median
proposer, who would otherwise be free to implement his preferred policy. When uncertainty is normally or uniformly
distributed, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on primitives for greater polarity to reduce the optimal
voting rule.
We then study how initial policy bias affects the optimal voting rule. Allowing the initial policy to differ from
the representative citizen’s expected bliss point, allows us to capture aspects of legislative policy/voting dynamics. In
particular, we can glean insights into how the optimal voting rule changes when past movement of policy is slow to
catch up with changes in society’s preferences. For example, the status quo on health care may be too conservative.
A slightly unrepresentative conservative congress would be unlikely to move policy; but an unrepresentative radical
congress would be able to convert the threat of bad conservative policy into equally bad (or worse) radical policy.
Reducing the voting rule reduces the costs associated with the first congress, but raises the costs associated with the
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second. Intuition might suggest that since initial policy bias makes the status quo less representative, on average, of
societal preferences, the social planner should rely more on the legislature to determine policy by reducing the size
of the supermajority. When e and m are normally distributed, we prove that this is only true when the volatility in
m is sufficiently high. In particular, when the dispersion of the median legislator around society’s preferred policy
is sufficiently small relative to the variation in society’s preferred policy, then introducing slight initial policy bias
raises the optimal voting rule. The intuition is that with slight policy bias, the proposers who are more likely to
be constrained by a given supermajority are those who would move the policy in the direction away from what the
representative citizen prefers.
Related Literature. The benefits and costs of delegating authority have been well studied. A number of studies have
shown the efficacy of supermajority rules in various settings. In the earliest study of optimal voting rules, Caplin and
Nalebuff [1988] show that a supermajority of 64 percent suffices to rule out Condorcet cycles when preferences are
sufficiently homogeneous.
Papers with results that have flavors related to ours include Klumpp [2005], Aghion et al. [2004] and Compte
and Jehiel [2010b]. Klumpp [2005] shows that in a model of indirect democracy, constituents may, in equilibrium,
select a representative with preferences closer to the status quo. In his model of the legislative process a proposer is
randomly selected. Electing a more conservative representative can moderate legislative outcomes, improving voter
welfare. This work is complementary to ours since in our model the optimal voting rule ensures that, on average,
more-moderate proposers (i.e., closer to society’s ideal) determine the change in policy.
In Aghion et al. [2004], the optimal rule trades off the possibility that an unethical politician will expropriate
funds, with the possibility that a minority of people will block a socially beneficial reform. They show that the optimal
amount of insulation depends on the size of the aggregate improvement from reform, the aggregate and idiosyncratic
uncertainties over reform outcomes, the degree of polarization of society, the individual degree of risk aversion, the
availability and efficiency of fiscal transfers, and the degree of protection of property rights against expropriation.
In contrast, in our model, the motivation of elected politicians is pure. Uncertainty is over the politicians’ preferred
policy point rather than their integrity.
Compte and Jehiel [2010b] show that in a model of collective search, unanimity is undesirable in large committees
with sufficiently patient members. Generally speaking, unanimity makes it difficult to find a proposal that is acceptable
to all, thereby inducing costly delay. The optimal majority rule is the one that solves best the trade-off between
speeding up the decision-making process and avoiding the risk of adopting relatively inefficient proposals. In our
model the optimal voting rule solves best the trade-off between a flexible legislative process that can respond to
changes in society’s tastes and a conservative legislative process that can guard against radical legislators.
Another strand of research examines optimal voting rules as a way to aggregate information when information is
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dispersed throughout the electorate. Young [1995] is a good review. This role for voting is absent in our model since
all agents are endowed with the same information.
Several papers study voting rules in settings where issues of dynamic consistency can arise, and supermajorities
can commit future governments to behave appropriately (see e.g., Gradstein [1999], Messner and Polborn [2004],
Dal Bo [2006], Duggan and Kalandrakis [2007] and Acemoglu et al. [2008]). Our model has no dynamic consis-
tency problems. Supermajorities arise not from concern about the damage a future government might do, but from
uncertainty about what the current government might do.
Section 2.2 presents our model of the legislative process. In Section 2.3 we characterize how the nature of un-
certainty over society’s preferences and those of the median legislator affect optimal voting rules when the median
legislator is the proposer. Section 2.4 characterizes optimal voting rules when the proposer can be less representative
than the median of the legislature’s preferences. Section 2.5 explores how the relative position of initial policy to
society’s tastes affects the optimal majority. Section 2.6 concludes. All proofs are in the Section 2.7.
2.2 The Model
Government policy, S, is defined over the real line. There is an initial government policy, S0, normalized to zero,
which we refer to as the status quo. A legislative process that we describe shortly, generates a new policy S1. We
consider a representative citizen with policy bliss point e who derives utility U = −E(S1 − e)2 from the policy S1
that is implemented. We will consider a setting that induces symmetric uncertainty over policy outcomes, in which
case one can interpret the representative citizen as the median voter.1
To capture evolving societal tastes for government policy (e.g., due to changing economic conditions) we assume
that the representative citizen’s preferred policy e is distributed according to some non-trivial distribution Fe with an
associated density fe that is symmetric around zero. For example, in times of high unemployment society may prefer
increased government spending, or in times of war, society may prefer reduced personal freedoms. Unfortunately
for citizens, policy is determined by a legislature whose preferences may not perfectly mirror society’s. This non-
alignment of interests may reflect the limited information voters have about legislator preferences, the institutional
design of heterogeneous districts, the impact of party affiliation, incumbency advantage, special interest group pres-
sure, and so on. To capture this, we assume that the policy bliss point of the median legislator is given bym = e+µm,
where µm ∼ Fm with an associated density fm that is symmetric around e. That is, the median legislator’s preferences
only correspond to those of the representative citizen’s on average. The distribution of bliss points in the legislature is
described by Fl with an associated density fl that is symmetric around m.
1With quadratic preferences, the ex-ante preferences of a voter whose bliss point e + δ is always δ from the median voter equal those of the
median minus the constant δ2. Hence, maximizing the median voter’ ex-ante welfare also maximizes the welfare of all voters (see e.g., Bernhardt
et al. [2009] and Bernhardt et al. [2011] for similar results).
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Next, a representative is selected to propose a new government policy k on which the legislature will vote. The
proposer’s policy bliss point is given by p = m+µp, where µp ∼ Fp. We assume symmetry, Fp(−µp) = 1−Fp(µp),
for µp > 0. Much of our analysis focuses on two particular distributions. We focus largely on the possibility that
the median legislator is always the proposer, in which case µp is the degenerate random variable equal to zero. This
possibility allows us to shed light on the trade-offs a social planner faces when he gives the legislature more freedom.
We also consider the possibility that µp ∈ {−up, up}. The parameter up, i.e., the proposer’s distance from the median
legislator, captures the effect of increased polarity of a proposer in a legislature in a transparent and analytically
tractable way.
Finally, legislators simultaneously vote on whether or not to replace current government policy (the status quo)
with the proposed policy k. A legislator is completely characterized by his policy bliss point, and so we refer to
a legislator with policy bliss point b as legislator b. The objective of each legislator, including the proposer, is to
minimize the distance between his bliss point and the policy that the legislature adopts. To defeat the status quo and
be adopted, a proposal must garner the required proportion, α, of votes from the legislature. After the vote is taken,
policy is implemented and payoffs are realized.
The social planner chooses the voting rule α (the proportion of votes required to change policy) that maximizes
the representative citizen’s ex-ante welfare. When deciding on the appropriate voting rule the social planner takes into
consideration the incentives facing a proposer, who, in turn, must consider the incentives of his legislative colleagues.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a voting rule α ∈ [0, 1], a policy proposal function k(p,m, α, S0)→ R, and a voting
rule for legislators v(l, k, S0, α)→ {0, 1} such that:
• the voting rule α maximizes the representative citizen’s ex-ante expected utility given the optimal policy choice
k(p,m, α, S0) by each proposer p, and legislator voting rules, v(l, k, S0, α);
• for each proposer p, k(p,m, α, S0) minimizes |S1 − p| given the voting rule α, the status quo S0, the position
of the median legislator m, and legislator voting rules v(l, k, S0, α);
• each legislator l votes for the proposal k, v(l, k, S0, α) = 1, if |k − l| ≤ |l − S0|, and votes for the status quo
alternative, v(l, k, S0, α) = 0, otherwise;
where the law of motion for new policy, S1, is governed by
S1 =

k(p,m, α, S0) if
∫∞
−∞ v(l, k, S0, α)dFl(l) ≥ α
S0 otherwise.
Implicit in the equilibrium definition is the assumption that legislators adopt the weakly dominant strategy of voting
for a policy k if and only if they weakly prefer it to the status quo. This assumption rules out uninteresting equilibria
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e.g., where a policy k wins because a proposer believes that everyone will vote against any other policy (even though
more than measure α of legislators prefer a policy k′ to k that the proposer also prefers).
Legislator l weakly prefers policy k to the status quo of zero if and only if l lies no further from k than from the
status quo. Hence, legislator l > 0 supports policy k if and only if k ∈ [0, 2l]. The set of policies supported by
legislator l′ > l > 0 is [0, 2l′], which is a superset of the set of policies supported by l. A legislator at l < 0 supports a
policy if and only if it is in the interval [2l, 0]. The set of policies supported by a legislator l′ < l < 0 is [2l′, 0], which
is a superset of the set of policies supported by l. Finally, if two legislators l and l′ support the same policy, then so do
all legislators located between them.
We define R(m,α) to be the feasible policy set, i.e., the set of policies that are preferred to the status quo by the
required proportion α of legislators when the median legislator is located at m. Let xα = F−1l (α) −m. Note that if
α < 1/2, then xα < 0. We will show that |xα| is the distance from the median legislator that identifies the legislators
who are crucial in determining R(m,α). Following Compte and Jehiel [2010a], we refer to these legislators, located
atm−|xα| andm+ |xα|, as key legislators. We call the set of legislators to the left of both key legislators the “radical
left”, the set of legislators to the right of both key legislators the “radical right”, and the set of legislators between
both key legislators the “conservative middle”.
Minority Voting Rule (α < 1/2). With a minority voting rule, a policy is feasible if and only if it is supported by
at least one key legislator. For example, suppose that |m| < −xα (Figure 2.1.1). The key legislator at m + xα < 0
supports any policy in [2(m + xα), 0] against the status quo, as does the radical left. The measure of the radical left
is exactly α. This group forms the required minority to change policy to any point in [2(m+ xα), 0]. In contrast, the
key legislator m + xα < 0 supports the status quo against any policy k < 2(m + xα) as does the radical right and
the conservative middle. The measure of this group is exactly 1−α. Hence, this group forms the required majority to
block any change in policy to k < 2(m+ xα).
The key legislator at m− xα > 0 supports any policy in [0, 2(m− xα)] against the status quo, as does the radical
right. Since the measure of the radical right is exactly α, this group forms the required minority to change policy to
any point in [0, 2(m − xα)]. In contrast, the key legislator m − xα > 0 supports the status quo against any policy
k > 2(m− xα) as does the radical left and the conservative middle. The measure of this group is exactly 1− α, and
hence this group forms the required majority to block any change in policy to k > 2(m− xα).
In general, if one key legislator supports the proposal, so too does one of the radical groups, which represents the
required minority to pass the proposal. If both key legislators reject the proposal, then so too does the conservative
middle and at least one radical group. These two groups form the required majority to block the proposal. Figures
2.1.2 and 2.1.3 show R(m,α) for the other possible values of m and xα when α < 1/2.
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fl
S10 m m− xαm+ xα2(m+ xα) 2(m− xα)
2.1.1: α < 1/2; |m| < −xα.
fl
S10 m m− xαm+ xα 2(m− xα)
2.1.2: α < 1/2; 0 < m+ xα.
fl
S10m m− xαm+ xα2(m+ xα)
2.1.3: α < 1/2; m− xα < 0.
fl
S10 m m+ xαm− xα
2.1.4: α > 1/2; |m| < xα.
fl
S10 m m+ xαm− xα
2(m− xα)
2.1.5: α > 1/2; 0 < m− xα.
fl
S10m m+ xαm− xα
2(m+ xα)
2.1.6: α > 1/2; m+ xα < 0.
Figure 2.1: We denote the feasible policy set, R(m,α), by the thick black line. Figures 2.1.1 to 2.1.3 show R(m,α)
when α < 1/2. Figures 2.1.4 to 2.1.6 show R(m,α) when α > 1/2. The shaded areas represent the required
proportion α of legislators who support a movement in policy from zero to any point in R(m,α).
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Majority Voting Rule (α ≥ 1/2). When the voting rule is a supermajority (α > 1/2), a proposal succeeds if and only
if it is supported by both key legislators, m − xα < m and m + xα > m. For example, suppose |m| < xα (Figure
2.1.4). The key legislator at m−xα < 0 supports the status quo against any policy k > 0, as does the radical left. The
measure of this group of legislators is exactly 1 − α, thus forming the required minority to block a change in policy
to any k > 0. The key legislator at m+ xα > 0 supports the status quo against any policy k < 0, as does the radical
right, thereby forming the required minority to block any change in policy to k < 0. As a result, when |m| < xα the
feasible policy set is just the status quo.
More generally, if both key legislators support a proposal, so too does the conservative middle and one of the
radical groups. Together these two groups form the required majority α to pass a proposal. If one of the key legislators
does not support a proposal, neither does one of the radical groups. This group forms the required minority 1 − α to
block the proposal. Figures 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 show R(m,α) for the other possible values of m and xα when α > 1/2.
Feasible Policy Sets. Summarizing, we have that the feasible policy sets are given by
for α < 1/2, R(m,α) =

[0, 2(m− xα)] if 0 < m+ xα
[2(m+ xα), 2(m− xα)] if |m| < −xα
[2(m+ xα), 0] if m− xα < 0
, and
for α ≥ 1/2, R(m,α) =

[0, 2(m− xα)] if 0 < m− xα
0 if |m| < xα
[2(m+ xα), 0] if m+ xα < 0.
When α is small, for any realization of m there always exist alternative policies that are more preferred by the
required minority. This minority is always the radical group furthest from the status quo. When α < 1/2 and m is
sufficiently close to the status quo, then policies can be found on either side of the status quo that garner the necessary
support for a policy change. As α increases, the feasible policy set R(m,α) shrinks. When α > 1/2 and the median
legislator is sufficiently close to the status quo then policy movement in one direction is blocked by the radical group
that lies on the opposite side of the status quo. In such a case no change to the status quo is possible. For sufficiently
extreme m, the interval of policies that garner sufficient support for a policy change lies to one side of the status quo.
As in Compte and Jehiel [2010a], under majority rules, the set of possible policy changes is the same as if only
the key legislators were present and unanimity among key legislators were required to change policy. Under minority
rules, the set of possible policy changes is the same as if only the key legislators were present and support from only
one legislator was required to change policy.
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Policy Outcomes. Given a voting rule α, the proposer p presents to the legislature the feasible policy that he most
prefers. Thus, the implemented policy solves
S1 = min
k∈R(m,α)
|p− k|. (2.1)
This policy k is unique since R(m,α) is closed and the objective function is strictly quasi-concave. Obviously, policy
remains unchanged if the feasible policy set consists only of the status quo. If p lies inside the feasible policy set, the
new policy is exactly p — the proposer can move policy to his bliss point. Such a proposer is free. When a proposer
lies on the opposite side of the status quo to the feasible policy set or the feasible policy set only consists of the status
quo, then he cannot make a change in policy that raises his utility. Such a proposer is blocked.
In all other cases, the proposer is constrained: the proposer can move policy, but only part of the way toward his
preferred policy. When the voting rule is a minority, the policy proposal only needs to make the key legislator closest
to the proposer indifferent between the proposal and the status quo. For example, suppose that α < 1/2, m+ xα < 0
and p < 2(m+ xα). Then, the feasible policy set is [2(m+ xα), 0] and the proposer proposes k = 2(m+ xα). This
policy makes the key member who lies closest to p, m+ xα, indifferent.
When the voting rule is a supermajority, the policy proposal will be preferred by the closer key legislator, but must
also make the key legislator who lies closest to the status quo indifferent between the proposal and the status quo. For
example, suppose that α > 1/2, m−xα > 0 and p > 2(m−xα). Then, the feasible policy set is [−, 2(m−xα)] and
he proposes k = 2(m− xα), the policy that makes the key legislator closest to the status quo, m− xα, indifferent.
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From this we derive the implemented policy S1 as an explicit function of m, p and xα:
For α < 1/2, S1 =

0 if m− xα < 0 < p or m+ xα > 0 > p
p if (m− xα < 0 and 2(m+ xα) < p < 0)
or (m+ xα > 0 and 0 < p < 2(m− xα))
or (|m| < −xα and |2mt − p| < −2xα)
2(m+ xα) if m+ xα < 0 and p < 2(m+ xα)
2(m− xα) if 0 < m− xα and 2(m− xα) < p.
(2.2)
For α ≥ 1/2, S1 =

0 if |m| < xα or m < 0 < p or m > 0 > p
p if (m− xα > 0 and 0 < p < 2(m− xα))
or (m+ xα < 0 and 2(m+ xα) < p < 0)
2(m− xα) if m− xα > 0 and 2(m− xα) < p
2(m+ xα) if m+ xα < 0 and 2(m+ xα) > p.
(2.3)
For very small voting rules, a proposer can typically successfully propose his own position as the new policy: there
is usually a radical group that provides sufficient support. As the required vote share increases, more often he must
adjust his proposal to obtain the necessary support. For large voting rules, no such adjustment exists if the status quo
lies closer to the median legislator than both key legislators.
Initially we assume only that the densities fe and fm are symmetric, quasi-concave, mean-zero distributions. We
later consider three classes of distributions—two-point, normal and uniform—that allow explicit characterizations
of the optimal voting rule. Section 2.5 considers bias in the initial policy. Throughout, we assume there is enough
dispersion in the bliss points of legislators that first-order conditions characterize the optimal majority, i.e., the support
of fl is sufficiently large.
Minority Rules Are Never Optimal. We first show that the social planner can restrict attention to majority voting
rules.
Lemma 5. A minority voting rule is never an optimal voting rule.
Lemma 5 is intuitive. Increasing the submajority rule reduces the set of possibly successful legislative changes
around the median legislator. On average, the median legislator is more representative of the populace than a non-
median proposer. As a result, welfare increases. As the optimal voting rule is a majority rule, we now refer to xα ≥ 0
as a voting rule distance.
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With majority voting rules, α ≥ 1/2, the representative citizen’s ex-ante expected utility is
U =−
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫ −xα
−∞
[∫ 2(m+xα)
−∞
(e− 2(m+ xα))2dFp(p−m) +
∫ 0
2(m+xα)
(e− p)2dFp(p−m)
+
∫ ∞
0
e2dFp(p−m)
]
dFm(m− e) +
∫ xα
−xα
[∫ ∞
−∞
e2dFp(p−m)
]
dFm(m− e)
+
∫ ∞
xα
[∫ 0
−∞
e2dFp(p−m) +
∫ 2(m−xα)
0
(e− p)2dFp(p−m)
+
∫ ∞
2(m−xα)
(e− 2(m− xα))2dFp(p−m)
]
dFm(m− e)
)
dFe(e). (2.4)
The first three triple integrals are associated with realizations for which the median and key legislators lie to the left
of the status quo. The first triple integral is associated with a key legislator who lies so close to the left of the status
quo that change in policy is constrained to win the key legislator’s support. The second triple integral is associated
with key legislators who lie far enough to the left of the status quo that the proposer is unconstrained in proposing
policy change. The third triple integral is associated with a proposer who lies to the right of the status quo and is, thus,
unable to change policy. The fourth triple integral is associated with a median legislator lying on the opposite side of
the status quo to a key legislator. In such a case, policy cannot be changed since the left key legislator votes against
movement in policy to the right and the right key legislator votes against movement in policy to the left. The last three
triple integrals have analogous interpretations, except that the median and key legislators lie to the right of the status
quo.
The relevant primitive for the social planner is the voting rule distance xα. The distribution of the legislature
around the median legislator, Fl, only enters payoffs indirectly via the linear distance xα implied by the voting rule.
A social planner, in ignorance of Fl, can establish the optimal voting rule distance, x∗α. This distance is invariant
to changes in the distribution of the legislature. The optimal voting rule delivers the optimal voting distance. This
implies the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Suppose that Fl2(·|l > 0) > Fl1(·|l > 0) for Fl1(·|l > 0) < 1. Then α∗l1 ≥ α∗l2 . The inequality is
strict if α∗l2 > 1/2.
Unanimity Is Never Optimal. The social planner always prefers a voting rule that allows at least slight movement
in policy to one that blocks all proposers. This is because as the voting rule decreases, the first proposers to be
‘unblocked’ are those who lie on the same side of the status quo as the representative citizen, but are further away.
The marginal effect of reducing the majority rule to unblock these first proposers is always to move policy toward the
representative citizen’s bliss point, raising welfare. We formalize this in Proposition 10:
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Proposition 10. Let Fm have bounded support, [−m¯, m¯], and Fe have positive variance. Voting rules that are close
enough to unanimity to prevent any change in policy, can never be optimal.
The requirements of the proposition are weak. Quasi-concavity is not required and symmetry can be dropped.
Choosing a voting rule distance that slightly exceeds the maximum of the absolute value of the support of Fm does
better than unanimity.
Optimal Voting Rule. Lemma 5 and Proposition 10 imply that, in general, the first-order condition that characterizes
the optimal voting rule distance, x∗α, is
∂U
∂xα
= 8
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −xα
−∞
(e− 2(m+ xα))Fp(m+ 2xα)dFm(m− e)dFe(e) ≤ 0, (2.5)
with strict equality if x∗α > 1/2, where we use the symmetry of Fp, Fe and Fm to simplify the expression. When
x∗α > 1/2, the social planner’s optimal choice is summarized by the following maxim: choose the voting rule such
that, conditional on the proposer being constrained, the expected value of new policy equals the expected bliss point
of the representative citizen.
To understand the social planner’s tradeoffs, recognize that a marginal increase in the voting rule affects welfare
in two ways. First, raising xα can raise the probability that a proposer is constrained: (a) there are more realizations of
the legislature for which the feasible policy set is just the status quo, and hence the limit of integration over m shrinks;
and (b) for those realizations of the legislature for which the feasible set is non-trivial, the probability that the proposer
is constrained, Fp(m + 2xα), rises. This is because with larger voting rules, a non-trivial feasible policy set requires
more extreme median legislators, and hence more extreme proposers relative to the status quo, are more likely.
Second, raising xα affects the realized policy when a proposer is constrained. Consider a proposer p, located to
the left of 2(m + xα) < 0. The proposer must win approval from the key legislator at m + xα, resulting in a new
policy of 2(m+ xα). A marginal increase in xα moves policy toward the status quo by twice the increase in xα, and
the effect on utility, given e and m is 8(e − 2(m + xα)). Therefore, if the representative citizen’s bliss point lies to
the right of the new policy (e > 2(m + xα)), then a marginal increase in xα raises utility; but if the representative
citizen’s bliss point lies to the left (e < 2(m+ xα)) then it reduces utility.
Were the dispersion in the representative citizen’s preferred policy to go to zero, the social planner’s optimal
voting rule becomes large enough to prevent changes to the status quo. Intuitively, there is no need for a legislature
if the electorate never changes its mind. At the other extreme, the optimal voting rule of a society with a perfectly
representative median legislator who always proposes legislative changes is a simple majority.
These two extreme scenarios do not imply that increasing the dispersion in the median legislator’s preferred policy
around the representative citizen’s bliss point always increases the optimal voting rule. To convey why this is so, we
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first characterize the optimal voting rule when the median legislator is always the proposer. This is equivalent to p
being a degenerate random variable equal to zero, i.e., Fp(z) = 0 if z is negative and Fp(z) = 1 otherwise.
2.3 Median legislator proposes policy
The first-order condition that characterizes the optimal voting rule is derived from equation (2.5) where Fp(m+ 2xα)
is zero if m < −2xα and is one if m > −2xα. At the optimal voting rule,
∂U
∂xα
= 8
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −xα
−2xα
(e− 2(m+ xα))dFm(m− e)dFe(e) ≤ 0, (2.6)
where equation (2.6) must hold as an equality if the optimal voting rule exceeds simple majority.
We next characterize how the optimal voting rule varies with primitives for three classes of distributions. For
each class, we find that an increase in the dispersion of the median legislator around the representative citizen’s bliss
point increases the optimal voting rule. We then show how the simple conjecture that increased dispersion in fm
(i.e., a first-order stochastic shift in fm(·|m ≥ 0)) necessarily leads to a weakly larger optimal voting rule is not well
founded.
Two-point uncertainty. We first consider the possibility that the representative citizen’s bliss point e and that of the
median legislator m are drawn from distributions with two-point supports, characterized by ue and um respectively.
Here ue measures the possible dispersion in society’s bliss point and um measures the extent of the representativeness
of society by the legislature. Thus,
Fm(m− e) =

0 if m− e < −um
1/2 if − um ≤ m− e < um
1 if um ≤ m− e.
; Fe(e) =

0 if e < −ue
1/2 if − ue ≤ e < ue
1 if ue ≤ e.
. (2.7)
To construct the first-order condition that characterizes the optimal voting rule distance, one can substitute equation
(2.7) into equation (2.6). However, it is more instructive to explicitly derive the representative citizen’s utility given
the two-point distribution and then derive the first-order condition. The representative citizen’s utility depends on the
relative values of ue, um and xα.
We focus on the case where ue > um and +ue is realized (analyses of the other possibilities are similar). When
xα is sufficiently small relative to both ue and um, that xα < ue−um2 , then the median legislator is free in his choice of
new policy. As a result, the implemented policy is exactly distance um from ue, so the representative citizen’s utility
is −u2m. As xα is increased, eventually the left-wing median proposer, i.e., the median legislator to the left of the
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ue − um
u2m
ue + umxα 2xα
2.2.1: xα < ue−um2 .
0
(ue − 2(um + xα))2
ue − um
u2m
ue + umxα 2xα
2.2.2: ue−um
2
< xα < min{ue − um, ue+um2 }.
0
(ue − 2(um + xα))2
ue − um
(ue + 2(um − xα))2
ue + umxα 2xα
2.2.3: ue+um
2
< xα < ue − um.
0
u2e
ue − um
u2m
ue + umxα 2xα
2.2.4: ue − um < xα < ue+um2 .
0
u2e
ue − um
(ue + 2(um − xα))2
ue + umxα 2xα
2.2.5: max{ue − um, ue+um2 } < xα < ue + um.
0
u2e
ue − um
u2e
ue + um xα
2.2.6: ue + um < xα.
Figure 2.2: These figures show how utility changes as the required majority changes when Fe and Fm are two-point
distributions characterized by the parameters ue and um, when ue > um and +ue is drawn.
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representative citizen’s bliss point, becomes constrained in his choice of new policy (recall that +ue is realized), while
the right-wing median legislator remains free. Increasing xα further, the left-wing median legislator becomes blocked,
while the right-wing median legislator becomes constrained; which happens first depends on the relative values of ue
and um. If ue − um < ue+um2 the former occurs first, otherwise the latter does. Eventually, the voting rule distance
becomes so large, in particular, xα > ue + um, that both median legislators are blocked. With no change in policy,
utility is −u2e.
Figure 2.2 summarizes these possible utility realizations; there are six possible cases depending on the relative
values of ue, um and xα. The points on the line are labeled from below and indicate the position of the median
legislator (either ue − um or ue + um) relative to the status quo (0) and the important distances implied by the voting
rule (xα and 2xα). The labels above the proposers show the disutility associated with the new policy generated under
the assumed voting rule. For example, Figure 2.2.1 shows that when 2xα < ue − um, the new policy is always um
distance from ue. Hence, disutility is u2m. In contrast, Figure 2.2.6 shows that when ue + um < xα, policy is never
changed so disutility is always u2e.
Proposition 11. Let e ∈ {−ue, ue} and let m ∈ {e− um, e+ um}, each with probability 1/2. Then, if ue >
√
2um,
i.e, if society’s preferences are sufficiently more dispersed than the median legislator’s, the optimal voting rule leaves
the median legislator completely free to change policy, i.e., x∗α is any element of [0,
|ue−um|
2 ]. If ue <
√
2um, the
optimal voting rule rule blocks the median legislator closest to the status quo from making any changes to policy and
constrains the median legislator furthest from the status quo to enact new policy exactly equal to the representative
citizen’s bliss point, i.e., x∗α = um + ue/2. When ue =
√
2um, either policy is optimal.
0
x∗α
ue
um
√
2um
2.3.1: x∗α as a function of ue given um.
0
x∗α
um
( 1√
2
+ 12 )ue
ue√
2
2.3.2: x∗α as a function of um given ue.
Figure 2.3: The optimal voting rule distance when Fe and Fm are both two-point distributions characterized by
parameters ue and um, respectively.
Figure 2.3 shows the optimal voting rule for different values of ue and um. Note that as um increases, the optimal
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voting rule distance (weakly) increases. Intuitively, when the dispersion in the median legislator’s bliss point around
that of the representative citizen is higher, the median legislator is typically less representative of the representative
citizen’s preferences, as is, on average, the resulting policy outcome. As a result, the social planner prefers to rely
more on the status quo than the legislative process in determining policy.
U
xα
0
ue−um
2
ue − um
ue+um
2 ue + um
ue
2 + um
−u2m = −u2e/2
−u2e
Figure 2.4: Expected utility when ue =
√
2um.
The optimal voting rule is discontinuous in ue and um going from simple majority to a large supermajority. To
understand this discontinuity, one must understand how a marginal increase in xα affects policy when xα is small and
ue > um. Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 show that when +ue is drawn, increasing xα marginally from xα < ue−um2 to
xα >
ue−um
2 , only serves to constrain the median legislator closer to the status quo who would move policy in the
direction that the representative citizen prefers, while leaving the median legislator furthest from the status quo (who
can exploit the fact that most legislators are closer to his bliss point than the status quo) unconstrained. As Figure
2.4 reveals, utility falls, since policy outcomes are now constrained to lie further from the representative citizen’s
bliss point e. Utility continues to fall as the legislator closest to the status quo is further constrained, reaching a
local minimum once he becomes blocked (Figure 2.2.4). This effect always exists whenever a proposer lies between
the status quo and the representative citizen. An increase in the voting rule reduces welfare, as the new policy is
constrained away from the representative citizen’s bliss point.
However, once increases in xα start to constrain the median legislator furthest from the status quo who moves
policy past e, utility starts to rise as policy outcomes are constrained to lie closer to e (Figure 2.2.5). Utility reaches a
local maximum once the median legislator furthest from the status quo is constrained so that he can do no better than
enact exactly e. After this point, further increases in the voting rule constrain policy outcomes to lie further from e,
reducing welfare.
It follows that the social planner’s optimal choice of xα is one of two alternatives: (1) simple majority, or (2) the
voting rule that blocks a median legislator who is closer to the status quo than to e and exactly constrains the median
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legislator who is further from the status quo than the representative citizen so that the new policy that he adopts exactly
equals e. As Figure 2.4 shows, when ue =
√
2um, the social planner is indifferent between these two choices.
Uniform uncertainty. We now characterize the optimal voting rule when e and m are drawn from uniform distribu-
tions.
Proposition 12. Let e ∼ U(−a, a) and m ∼ U(e − b, e + b). If society’s preference are sufficiently more dispersed
than the median legislator’s, so that a > 11+4
√
7
18 b ≈ 1.2b, then the optimal voting rule is simple majority. As society’s
preferences become less dispersed, x∗α increases up to the point where a = b, and x
∗
α = b for a ≤ b.
0
x∗α
a
b
b 1.2b
2.5.1: x∗α as a function of a given b.
0
x∗α
b
a
a0.84a
2.5.2: x∗α as a function of b given a.
Figure 2.5: The optimal majority when e ∼ U [−a, a] and m ∼ U [−b, b].
Figure 2.5 plots the optimal majority distance for different values of a and b. Once again, as dispersion in the
median legislator’s possible preferred policy increases, so does the optimal voting rule. The social planner prefers
less flexibility in the legislative process since the median position becomes less representative of society’s preferences
relative to the status quo.
When b ≥ a, i.e., when the dispersion in the median legislator’s preferences around society’s preferred policy
exceeds the dispersion in society’s preferred policy, the optimal voting rule distance is exactly b. That is, the optimal
voting rule always constrains or blocks the median legislator—the median legislator is never free to propose his
preferred policy. Recall that the voting rule maximizes utility when, conditional on a change in policy, the expected
new policy equals the representative citizen’s expected bliss point. With sufficient uniform uncertainty in the median
legislator’s bliss pointm around e relative to that for e, the social planner’s solution is particularly simple. By choosing
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xα equal to the maximum possible distance of the median legislator from e, i.e., xα = b, the social planner ensures
that for any realization of e, the distribution over policy is uniformly distributed on [0, 2e], implying that the expected
change in new policy exactly equals e.
To convey intuition for this result, Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of new policy for three different voting rules:
xα = b − e (Figure 2.6.1), xα = b (Figure 2.6.2) and xα = b + e (Figure 2.6.3). Let e ∈ [0, a] (analysis when
e ∈ [−a, 0] is similar) and consider first the optimal voting rule xα = b. The probability of a policy change is e2b , and
policy is changed when m ∈ (b, e + b]. If m = b, then S1 = 0. If m = e + b, then S1 = 2e. Hence, conditional on
a change in policy, the new policy is distributed uniformly between zero and 2e. For realizations where the median
legislator lies close to the status quo, inertia is too high. For realizations where the median legislator lies far from
the status quo, inertia is too low. However, the optimality condition that the expected new policy exactly equals the
representative citizen’s bliss point holds.
Now consider a slightly larger voting rule xα = b+ . For any e ∈ [0, ], no policy change is possible. However,
the effect on utility is to a third order. For any e ∈ [, a] the probability of a change in policy is e−2b . If m = b + ,
then S1 = 0. If m = e+ b, then S1 = 2(e− ). Hence, conditional on a change in policy, the new policy is distributed
uniformly between zero and 2(e− ). Comparing Figures 2.6.2 and 2.6.3 reveals that the net effect of a slightly larger
voting rule is to reduce utility because policy outcomes marginally less than 2e are replaced by the status quo of zero
— there is too little policy movement.
S1
0
f(S1)
2(e+ )
2b−(e+)
2b 1
4b
2.6.1: xα = b− .
S1
0
f(S1)
2e
2b−e
2b
1
4b
2.6.2: xα = b.
S1
0
f(S1)
2(e− )
2b−(e−)
2b
1
4b
2.6.3: xα = b+ .
Figure 2.6: The distribution of new policy S1 given e ∈ [, a] when b > e; the dot at S1 = 0 is the point mass on the
status quo policy outcome of zero.
The analysis for a slightly smaller voting rule, xα = b− , is similar. Figure 2.6.1 shows the distribution of policy
when e ∈ [−, a]. Figures 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 reveal that the net effect is to reduce utility as policy outcomes marginally
greater than 2e replace the status quo as the policy outcome: policy movement is too high.
To understand the discontinuity in the optimal voting rule when societal preferences are more dispersed than the
median legislator’s, i.e., a > b, recall the two-point distribution results (Proposition 11). There when µe > µm, a slight
increase in the voting rule from xα < µe−µm2 to xα >
µe−µm
2 reduced utility as the higher voting rule reduced policy
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Figure 2.7: Utility for different voting rule distances when a = 11+4
√
7
18 b.
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Figure 2.8: The marginal effect on expected utility of the representative citizen of an increase in the majority rule for
different values of a and b.
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movement toward the representative citizen. Only once the more extreme proposer was constrained did increases in
xα raise utility. When b is less than a and xα = 0, that same logic holds for all e ∈ [−b, b]. For all e 6∈ [−b, b],
marginally raising xα has no effect on policy outcomes. As a result, marginally raising the voting rule when xα = 0
always reduces welfare (Figures 2.8.1 and 2.8.2).
As xα increases, for realizations of e close to zero, the more extreme proposer becomes constrained and utility
rises, while for realizations of e far from zero, only the less extreme proposer is constrained, reducing utility. As b
approaches a, the measure of the former group increases relative to the latter. As Figure 2.8.1 shows, if a slightly
exceeds b, there exists a supermajority for which the positive marginal effect for higher supermajorities outweighs
the negative marginal effect for low supermajorities. If a substantially exceeds b, no such supermajority rule exists
(Figure 2.8.2).
Normal uncertainty. We now characterize optimal voting rules when the representative citizen’s bliss point and that
of the median legislator are normally distributed.
Proposition 13. Let e ∼ N(0, σ2e) and m ∼ N(e, σ2m). If σ2e < 2σ2m, the optimal voting rule declines with the
volatility of society’s bliss point, σe, and rises with the volatility in the representativeness of the legislature, σm.
Further, x∗α(γσe, γσm) = γx
∗
α(σe, σm) where x
∗
α(σe, σm) is the optimal voting rule distance given σe and σm. If
society’s preferences are sufficiently volatile relative to the volatility in legislative preferences, σ2e ≥ 2σ2m, then the
optimal voting rule is simple majority.
To prove this result, we first show that the optimal voting rule distance, if positive, solves
∆(σ2e , σ
2
m) ≡
2σ2m + σ
2
e
2δ2
= γ
[Φ (2γ)− Φ (γ)]
[φ (γ)− φ (2γ)] , (2.8)
where δ ≡ √σ2e + σ2m and γ ≡ xα/δ. We then use a L’Hoˆpital-type rule for monotonicity due to Pinelis [2002] to
show that the right-hand side of equation (2.8) is strictly increasing in γ. This implies that the optimal voting rule is
unique. The comparative statics follow directly.
As with the two-point class of distributions, x∗α increases as the median legislator becomes less representative of
society, in order to constrain the median from enacting extreme policies. As the dispersion in the median legislator’s
bliss point around e rises, the expected bliss point of the representative citizen, conditional on the median legislator
being constrained, is closer to the status quo. For a given voting rule, this would create excessive movement in
policy. The optimal voting rule must therefore be higher, reducing the movement in policy, so that, in expectation, the
representative citizen’s bliss point and new policy are again equal.
Increased dispersion in Fm. One might conjecture, based on consideration of Propositions 3–5, that when legis-
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latures are less representative, i.e., when there is greater dispersion in the median legislator’s location relative to the
representative citizen’s bliss point, then the optimal supermajority should always be greater in order to protect the
representative citizen from proposers who are more likely to be further from his bliss point. We now show that this
conjecture is false. To do this, we construct distributions Fm and Gm, where Fm(·|µm ≥ 0) ≥ Gm(·|µm ≥ 0), but
α∗F > α
∗
G. The loose intuition that we detail below is that the social planner would like to constrain some proposers
by more and others by less, and that some spreads of the distribution of proposers can raise the fraction of proposers
whom the social planner wants to constrain less.
Proposition 14. Let e ∼ U [−1, 1]. Let µm ∼ Fm with associated density f and µ′m ∼ Gm with associated density
g, where
f(z) =

0.026178 if z ∈ [−10,−8.9]
0.052944 if z ∈ (−8.9, 8.9)
0.026178 if z ∈ [8.9, 10]
and g(z) =

0.026178 if z ∈ [−10,−9.1]
0.052356 if z ∈ (−9.1, 9.1)
0.026178 if z ∈ [9.1, 10]
.
Then Fm(·|µm ≥ 0) ≥ Gm(·|µm ≥ 0) but x∗αF = 10 > 9.98934 = x∗αG.
When the median legislator m is close to the status quo he is always blocked from changing policy, so increasing
xα does not affect welfare. When m is an intermediate distance from the representative citizen’s bliss point, e so that
the constrained policy is closer to the status quo than is e, then increasing xα further constrains the new policy to lie
further from e, reducing welfare. The counter-example replaces median legislators very close to e with those slightly
further away. That is, the counter-example replaces legislators who are very likely to be always blocked with those
who tend to be an intermediate distance away. As a result, conditional on a change in policy, the expected new policy
is too close to the status quo and welfare is raised by marginally reducing the voting rule.
A similar effect could be realized if we replaced median legislators very far from e, who are (almost always) free,
with legislators a little closer to e, who are (almost always) constrained too little. Conditional on a change in policy,
expected new policy is too far from the status quo and welfare is raised by marginally increasing the voting rule.
2.4 More Extreme Proposers
We now consider proposers other than the median legislator. We are especially interested in how the extent of the
proposer’s extremism affects the optimal voting rule. We build this analysis up by supposing that the proposer is
randomly chosen from a two-point distribution: with equal probability the proposer lies up either to the left or the
right of the median legislator, so that Fp(z) = 0 if z < −up, Fp(z) = 1/2 if −up ≤ z < up, and Fp(z) = 1 if
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up ≤ z. We refer to up as the proposer’s polarity, since a higher up represents a more extreme proposer relative to
the legislature. When up is negative, the proposer is to the left of the median legislator, and we call him a left-wing
proposer; analogously when up is positive, we call him a right-wing proposer.
We next show that if up is large, so that the proposer is unrepresentative even of the legislature, then, as simple
intuition might suggest, further increases in the proposer’s polarity raise the optimal voting rule. However, this intu-
ition does not extend when up is small: we identify conditions for a marginal increase in the polarity of the proposer
to reduce the optimal voting rule.
First, we analyze policy movement for different proposers. If m is sufficiently far from the status quo, i.e., |m| >
2xα + up, then the proposer is always free. For example, consider an extreme right-wing median legislator at 2xα +
up+ . The key legislator lies at xα+up+ . The key legislator supports any policy in [0, 2(xα+up+ )], an interval
that includes both the left-wing proposer at 2xα +  and the right-wing proposer at 2xα + 2up + .
As m moves toward the status quo from the right, first the right-wing and then the left wing proposer become
constrained. A right-wing proposer is constrained when xα < m < 2xα + up since m + up > 2(m − xα), i.e.,
the proposer lies to the right of the feasible policy set. The right-wing proposer is blocked when m < xα since the
status quo becomes the sole feasible policy. A left-wing proposer is constrained when up < m < 2xα − up since
m−up > 2(m−xα), and is blocked whenm < up since he then lies on the opposite side of the status quo from a key
legislator. Analogously, as m moves toward the status quo from the left, first left-wing and then right-wing proposers
become constrained and then blocked.
Notice that when the median legislator is to the right of the status quo, a left-wing proposer is only constrained
if up < m < 2xα − up. This happens if and only if xα > up, i.e., if the voting rule is high relative to the
proposer’s polarity. Otherwise, when xα < up, the left-wing proposer is either free (when m > up) or blocked (when
0 < m < up).
m
I : F, F
−2xα − up
II : C,F
−up
III : C,B
−xα
IV : B,B
0 xα
V : B,C
up
V I : F,C
2xα + up
V II : F, F
2.9.1: up > xα.
m
I ′ : F, F
−2xα − up
II ′ : C,F
−2xα + up
III ′ : C,C
−xα
IV ′ : B,B
0 xα
V ′ : C,C
2xα − up
V I ′ : F,C
2xα + up
V II ′ : F, F
2.9.2: up < xα.
Figure 2.9: Realizations of proposer status (free – F , blocked – B, or constrained – C) for a given voting rule and
different realizations of the median legislator.
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Figure 2.9 illustrates these possibilities. For a given voting rule, we classify realizations of m into seven classes
based on the movement in the status quo for right- and left-wing proposers. This classification depends on whether
xα < up (Figure 2.9.1) or xα > up (Figure 2.9.2). The two letters above the line defining each region denote
the possible policy movement facing a left- or right-wing proposer, respectively. We denote a free proposer by F ,
a constrained proposer by C, and a blocked proposer by B. Thus, as Figure 2.9.1 shows, when up > xα and
xα < m < up then a left-wing proposer is blocked and a right-wing proposer is constrained.
The representative citizen’s utility when xα < up is
U = −
∫ ∞
−∞
[∫ −up−e
−∞
(µm + up)
2dFm(µm) +
∫ xα−e
−up−e
e2dFm(µm)
+
∫ 2xα+up−e
xα−e
(e+ 2(µm − xα))2dFm(µm) +
∫ ∞
2xα+up−e
(µm + up)
2dFm(µm)
]
dFe(e).
If, instead, the voting rule xα exceeds the polarity up of the proposer then his utility is
U = −
∫ ∞
−∞
[∫ −2xα+up−e
−∞
(µm + up)
2dFm(µm) +
∫ −xα−e
−2xα+up−e
(e+ 2(µm + xα))
2dFm(µm)
+
∫ xα−e
−xα−e
e2dFm(µm) +
∫ 2xα+up−e
xα−e
(e+ 2(µm − xα))2dFm(µm)
+
∫ ∞
2xα+up−e
(µm + up)
2dFm(µm)
]
dFe(e),
where we use the symmetry of the distributions to simplify the expressions.
The following proposition shows that when the proposer is sufficiently extreme, located further from the median
legislator than the indifferent key legislator, then further increases in extremism of the proposer raise the optimal
majority voting rule. Indexing the optimal voting rule by up, we have up > x∗α(up) > 0 implies
∂x∗α(up)
∂up
≥ 0:
Proposition 15. If up > x∗α(up) > 0, a marginal increase in up raises the optimal supermajority.
A marginal change in the voting rule affects utility only through its effect on constrained proposers. When the
legislature is highly polarized, i.e., when up is large relative to xα, the proposer closest to the status quo is never
constrained. The optimal voting rule distance, x∗α, ensures that conditional on the other proposer (the one furthest
from the status quo) being constrained, his expected proposed policy equals the representative citizen’s expected bliss
point.
Consider the proposer who is marginally free. This proposer lies exactly on the edge of the feasible policy set. A
marginal shift of this proposer away from the status quo makes the proposer constrained. For a given voting rule xα,
the marginally-free proposerm+up is located at 2(xα+up) and the marginally-free proposerm−up = −2(xα+up).
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For a given voting rule, the only effect on policy outcomes of raising a proposer’s polarity is when it shifts the
status of the proposer from free to constrained, i.e., when the proposer is marginally free. Such proposers now enter
the social planner’s first-order conditions at policies 2(xα + up) and −2(xα + up). To see that these marginally-free
proposers shift policy too far, on average, observe that the median legislator is located closer to the status quo than
these proposers; with the quasi-concavity of fe(e), the expected location of the representative citizen is also closer
to the status quo. Hence, a further increase in the already substantial polarity up of the proposer makes a larger
supermajority optimal.
The next proposition shows that this logic holds true more generally for distributions that place more weight on
sufficiently polarized proposers.
Proposition 16. Consider distributions F 1p and F 2p , where F 1p (z) = F 2p (z) for all −x∗α1 ≤ z ≤ x∗α1; but F 2p (z) has
more dispersed tails so that F 2p (z) ≤ F 1p (z) for all z > x∗α1, strictly for some z and x∗α1 > 0. Then x∗α2 > x∗α1.
The impact of increasing up on the optimal voting rule when both conservative and radical proposers can be
constrained, i.e., when xα > up, is less clear. Consider conservative and radical marginally-free proposers who lie
to the right of the status quo, i.e., the conservative proposer lies at 2(xα − up) > 0, while the radical proposer lies
further away at 2(xα+up). While both of these proposers move policy too far on average relative to the representative
citizen’s bliss point, the radical marginally-free proposer moves policy further, since he lies further from the status
quo.
An increase in the proposer’s polarity increases the measure of constrained radical proposers, and decreases that
of constrained conservative proposers. Since the median legislator associated with the conservative marginally-free
proposer lies closer to the status quo at 2xα−up than the median legislator associated with the radical marginally-free
proposer at 2xα +up, he is more likely to be realized. Therefore, the social planner places a higher probability weight
on conservative marginally-free proposers than on radical ones.
We next characterize sufficient conditions for the optimal voting rule to fall as the polarity of the proposer rises. In
general, for an increase in up to reduce the optimal voting rule, the dispersion of the median legislator around e must
be large relative to the variation in e. When this dispersion increases, so too does x∗α. The policy outcome induced
by a conservative marginally-free proposer lies closer to the status quo, and thus is given greater weight by the social
planner relative to the outcome induced by a radical marginally-free proposer.
Proposition 17. ( Uniform Uncertainty). Let e ∼ U [−a, a] and µm ∼ U [−b, b] where b > a, i.e., there is more
uncertainty about the median legislator’s preferences than society’s. Then, if the proposer’s polarity is intermediate,
b − a < up < b − a2 , the optimal supermajority is less than when the median is the proposer; abusing notation,
α∗up < α
∗
m. If up ≤ b− a or up ≥ b, then α∗up = α∗m.
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e = 2(m + xα)
m = −b
m = −2b2.10.1: up = 0.
m a−a
b
e
m
e = 2(m + xα)
m = −b
m = −b − a/2
m = −2b2.10.2: up = b− a/2.
Figure 2.10: These figures graphically depict the optimal voting rule first-order condition when e ∼ U [−a, a] and
m ∼ U [e− b, e+ b] for different polarities. The shaded area under m = −b is the area of integration.
Since b > a, at the optimal supermajority of b, the median proposer is never free. Figure 2.10 provides a graphical
representation of the proof. Figure 2.10.1 shows the first-order conditions when a < b, the voting rule distance is b and
the proposer’s polarity is zero. Figure 2.10.2 shows the first-order conditions with the same parameter values when
the proposer’s polarity is up = b− a/2. The light grey area in each figure represents the range of e and m for which
the integrand is negative and the dark grey area represents the range of e and m for which the integrand is positive. In
Figure 2.10.1 where up = 0, the light and dark grey areas exactly offset each other since the probability density of e
and m over each area is constant and equal.
This is no longer the case in Figure 2.10.2 where up = b − a/2. For values of e and m in the lightly shaded
areas, the density is the same as in Figure 2.10.1. The policy outcome for these values is exactly the same as when
the polarity is zero. However, the density of the black lower left triangle is half that of the lightly-shaded areas. This
triangle represents values of e and m for which the conservative proposer is constrained, while the radical proposer is
free. The resulting distribution of new policy is too close to the status quo. Reducing the voting rule improves welfare.
S1
0
f(S1)
2e
e + b − up
2(b − up)
2b−e
2b
1
4b
1
8b
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8b
Figure 2.11: The distribution of policy given e ∈ [, a] when b − up < e < b and xα = b; the dot at S1 = 0 is the
point mass on the status quo policy outcome of zero.
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Figure 2.11 shows the distribution of new policy under the voting rule xα = b when b− up < e < b. Comparing
Figures 2.11 and 2.6.2 reveals that the distribution of S1 close to the status quo is the same as when the median
legislator proposes policy. When m is sufficiently close to the status quo, the feasible policy set is small, and both
conservative and radical proposers are constrained. Shifting m one unit further away expands the feasible policy set
by two units, and if e is sufficiently far from the status quo that e − (b − up) > 0, then eventually outward shifts
leave the conservative polarized proposer free while the median and radical polarized proposers remain constrained.
It follows that relative to when the median legislator proposes policy, the distribution of policy outcomes is shifted
toward the status quo, indicating for these realizations of e that a lower supermajority, which reduces constraints on
conservative polarized proposers, would raise welfare. There are two relevant possibilities at the optimal voting rule
for the median proposer: either all three types of proposers are (equally) constrained, in which case they contribute in
the same way to the first-order conditions; or the conservative proposer is free, but the median and radical proposers
are constrained. It follows that reducing the supermajority slightly replaces a marginally-free median proposer who
implements the policy 2(e + ) with either a marginally-free radical proposer who also implements 2(e + ) or a
marginally-free conservative proposer who implements a policy 2(b − up − )] that is closer to that preferred by
society, raising welfare.
Proposition 18. (Normal Uncertainty). Let e ∼ N(0, σ2e) and µm ∼ N(0, σ2m). Then a marginal increase in up
from zero reduces the optimal voting rule if and only if σ2e/σ
2
m < β, where β = 4η
2 − 2 and η solves
4η2
8η2 − 2 = η
[Φ (2η)− Φ (η)]
[φ (η)− φ (2η)] .
When up is zero, i.e., when the median legislator is the proposer, then the first-order effect of an increase in up on
the optimal voting rule is zero (equation (2.16) in the Appendix). In the limit the conservative and radical marginally-
free proposers realize the same policy outcome and are given the same weight by the social planner since they have
the same probability of being realized.
The second-order effect is
∂3U
∂xα∂u2p
∣∣∣∣∣
up=0
= 8
∫ ∞
−∞
2fm(2xα + e) + (e+ 2xα)f
′
m(2xα + e)dFe(e). (2.9)
The first term in the integrand of equation (2.9) represents the net movement in policy away from the status quo
conditional on the proposer being constrained from the additional radical constrained proposers and fewer conservative
constrained proposers. This effect is always positive, and leads to higher voting rules. The second term represents the
difference in probability weight that the social planner places on the conservative marginally-free proposer relative to
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the radical marginally-free proposer. Since the density is symmetric around 2xα as a function of e, this difference is
strictly positive. For the sufficiently large voting rules implied in this context by the sufficiently high volatility in the
legislature relative to society, σ
2
e
σ2m
< β, the second effect outweighs the first.
2.5 Initial Policy Bias
We now study how initial policy bias affects the optimal voting rule: with bias the initial policy no longer equals the
representative citizen’s expected bliss point. This analysis sheds insights into how the optimal voting rule is affected
when past policy changes by the legislature are slow to catch up with societal preferences. Intuition might suggest that
initial policy bias should lead the social planner to rely more on the legislature to determine policy, and hence cause
him to reduce the voting rule. We show that this conjecture is false when the dispersion in m is sufficiently small
relative to the volatility in e. That is, we prove that when legislative preferences tend to be more representative of
society’s, then slight initial policy bias raises the optimal voting rule: whenever the legislature tends to be responsible,
slight policy bias causes the social planner to rely less on the legislature! Only when legislative preferences are less
likely to be representative of society’s, does initial policy bias reduce the optimal voting rule.
To begin we must redefine the feasible policy set for a general initial policy, S0. The feasible policy set has the
same general properties as when S0 = 0. In particular, for the reasons as outlined in Section 2.2, there still exist
key legislators whose support is necessary and sufficient to change policy. If the median legislator is too close to the
status quo, |m − S0| < xα, then the feasible policy set is the singleton S0 as one key legislator is always located on
the opposite side of the status quo from the median legislator. Otherwise, the feasible policy set, Rˆ(m,α, S0), is an
interval whose limit at one end is the status quo and at the other is the policy that makes the key legislator closest to
the status quo indifferent between the policy change and the status quo. When S0 < m − xα, the key legislator at
m− xα supports any policy k ∈ [S0, 2(m− xα)− S0]. When m + xα < S0, the key legislator at m + xα supports
any policy k ∈ [2(m+ xα)− S0, S0]. Summarizing, for α ≥ 1/2,
Rˆ(m,α, S0) =

[S0, 2(m− xα)− S0] if S0 < m− xα
S0 if |m− S0| < xα
[2(m+ xα)− S0, S0] if m+ xα < S0
.
A proposer p is free if p ∈ Rˆ(m,α, S0). If the closest element of the feasible policy set to the proposer is the
status quo, then the proposer is blocked. This occurs if either the feasible policy is the status quo or the proposer lies
on the opposite side of the status quo to the feasible policy set. Otherwise, the proposer is constrained.
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From this we derive S1 as an explicit function of m, p, S0 and xα. We again restrict attention to majority voting
rules. For α ≥ 1/2,
S1 =

S0 if |m1 − S0| < xα or m1 + xα < S0 < p or m1 − xα > S0 > p
p if (m1 + xα < S0 and 2(m1 + xα)− S0 < p < S0)
or (m1 − xα > S0 and S0 < p < 2(m1 − xα)− S0)
2(m1 + xα)− S0 if m1 + xα < S0 and p < 2(m1 + xα)− S0
2(m1 − xα)− S0 if S0 < m1 − xα and 2(m1 − xα)− S0 < p
.
As when S0 = 0, if the proposer’s polarity up exceeds xα then the proposer who lies closest to the status quo
is never constrained. He is either blocked (when the median legislator is sufficiently close to the status quo) or free
(when the median legislator is sufficiently far away).
If xα < up, then the representative citizen’s expected utility is
2U = −
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −up+S0−e
−∞
(µm + up)
2dFm(µm) +
∫ xα+S0−e
−up+S0−e
(e− S0)2dFm(µm)
+
∫ 2xα+up+S0−e
xα+S0−e
(e+ 2(µm − xα)− S0)2dFm(µm) +
∫ ∞
2xα+up+S0−e
(µm + up)
2dFm(µm)
+
∫ −2xα−up+S0−e
−∞
(µm − up)2dFm(µm) +
∫ −xα+S0−e
−2xα−up+S0−e
(e+ 2(µm + xα)− S0)2dFm(µm)
+
∫ up+S0−e
−xα+S0−e
(e− S0)2dFm(µm) +
∫ ∞
up+S0−e
(µm − up)2dFm(µm)dFe(e),
and if xα > up, then
2U = −
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −2xα+up+S0−e
−∞
(µm + up)
2dFm(µm) +
∫ −xα+S0−e
−2xα+up+S0−e
(e+ 2(µm + xα)− S0)2dFm(µm)
+
∫ xα+S0−e
−xα+S0−e
(e− S0)2dFm(µm) +
∫ 2xα+up+S0−e
xα+S0−e
(e+ 2(µm − xα)− S0)2dFm(µm)
+
∫ ∞
2xα+up+S0−e
(µm + up)
2dFm(µm) +
∫ −2xα−up+S0−e
−∞
(µm − up)2dFm(µm)
+
∫ −xα+S0−e
−2xα−up+S0−e
(e+ 2(µm + xα)− S0)2dFm(µm) +
∫ xα+S0−e
−xα+S0−e
(e− S0)2dFm(µm)
+
∫ 2xα−up+S0−e
xα+S0−e
(e+ 2(µm − xα)− S0)2dFm(µm) +
∫ ∞
2xα−up+S0−e
(µm − up)2dFm(µm)dFe(e).
Because the initial policy is biased, we can no longer use symmetry to simplify the expressions.
To facilitate analysis, we suppose that Fe and Fm are normally distributed. Greater initial policy bias implies that
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the status quo is less representative of society’s bliss point. The next two propositions provide sufficient conditions on
the volatility of societal preferences, median legislator preferences and the proposer’s polarity for an increase in initial
policy bias from zero to either decrease or increase the optimal supermajority.
Proposition 19. Let e ∼ N(0, σ2e) and m ∼ N(e, σ2m). Introducing a marginal bias in the initial policy away from
the representative citizen’s expected bliss point reduces the optimal voting rule if either (1) the median legislator is
the proposer and σ2e < 2σ
2
m, or (2) up > u˜p and λσ
2
e < σ
2
m where λ =
2(Φ(3)−Φ(1))−φ(1)+φ(3)
2(φ(1)−φ(3)+Φ(1)−Φ(3)) ≈ 0.480 and u˜p is
the polarity that solves
∆(σ2e , σ
2
m) =
up(Φ(3up/δ)− Φ(up/δ))
δ(φ(up/δ)− φ(3up/δ)) .
Proposition 20. Let e ∼ N(0, σ2e), m ∼ N(e, σ2m) and σ2m < χσ2e where χ = 2(1−Φ(1))−φ(1)2(φ(1)+Φ(1)−1) ≈ 0.452. There exists
u¯p such that for all up > u¯p, introducing a marginal bias in the initial policy away from the representative citizen’s
expected bliss point increases the optimal voting rule.
The first-order effect of slight positive policy bias on the optimal policy rule is zero. Proposers to the left of the
representative citizen’s expected bliss point are less constrained and generate greater shifts in policy away from the
status quo, but this is exactly offset by the reduced shifts away from the status quo by proposers to the right who are
more constrained.
Hence, we need to understand the second-order effects. These are similar in nature to those for the impact of a
marginal increase in the proposer’s polarity from zero:
∂3U(xα, S0)
∂xα∂S20
=4
∫ ∞
−∞
[(2(xα + up)− e)f ′m(2xα + up − e) + ef ′m(xα − e)]dFe(e). (2.10)
There are two second-order effects of a slight positive increase in policy bias from zero: those associated with changes
in the probabilities that a proposer is (a) marginally free vs. (b) marginally blocked, where a proposer is marginally
blocked when the median legislator lies exactly xα from the status quo.
With a positive marginal shift in the status quo, the marginally-free proposer to the left of the status quo is closer
to the representative citizen’s expected bliss point (implying insufficient policy movement), while the marginally-free
proposer to the right of the status quo is further from the expected bliss point (implying excessive policy movement).
Since the marginally-free proposer to the left of the status quo lies closer to the expected bliss point than the one to the
right, the social planner puts greater probability weight on the marginally-free proposer to the left, suggesting a larger
supermajority increases utility.
Offsetting this, however, the marginally-blocked proposer to the left of the status quo now lies closer to the rep-
resentative citizen’s ex-ante bliss point (implying excessive policy movement) and the marginally-blocked proposer
to the right of the status quo now lies further away (implying insufficient policy movement). Since the marginally-
69
blocked proposer to the left lies closer to the expected bliss point than the one to the right, the social planner puts
greater probability weight on the marginally-blocked proposer to the left, suggesting a larger supermajority decreases
utility.
Which effect dominates depends on the slopes of the density of the median legislator’s bliss point at the marginally-
free and marginally-blocked proposers. The optimal voting rule xα is a bounded function of up, implying an upper
bound to the marginally-blocked proposer effect. The weight the social planner places on the marginally-free proposer
effect is determined by the optimal voting rule and up. When up is high, and σ2m is small (so that xα is sufficiently
small), the weight the social planner places on the marginally-free proposer effect relative to the marginally-blocked
proposer effect is sufficient to cause x∗α to fall when slight initial policy bias is introduced.
2.6 Conclusion
Society’s preferences over government policy shift as circumstances and society itself evolve. Ceteris paribus, having
a legislature that can freely tailor policy to reflect society is good. However, a legislature’s composition may not
always reflect that of society. In particular, the views of the median legislator may sometimes be unrepresentative of
society: An unchecked legislature can sometimes implement bad policy. The legislative process itself, by choosing
more extreme agenda setters, may also generate less representative outcomes. We characterize how the optimal degree
of inertia—the required vote share to implement a proposed policy rather than the status quo—is affected by the
primitives describing the preferences of society, the median legislator, and the agenda setter.
The optimal voting rule trades off between excessively constraining “responsible” legislatures versus protecting
society from irresponsible ones. With quadratic societal preferences for government policy, when the initial status quo
is an unbiased representation of societal preferences, the optimal voting rule is such that, conditional on a proposer
being constrained by the legislature, the expected difference between new policy implemented and society’s bliss point
is zero.
Neither submajority voting rules nor unanimity are ever optimal; and for some distributions, slight supermajorities
may also never be optimal. Supermajority voting rules are blunt instruments, both restricting for good and for bad.
For realizations of the legislature that are close to both the status quo and the representative citizen’s bliss point, they
are overly restrictive, while for legislatures that are far from both the status quo and the representative citizen’s bliss
point, they are not restrictive enough. Discontinuity in the optimal voting rule as a function of the underlying param-
eters from majority to supermajority can emerge as slight supermajorities tend to restrict the less radical proposers
disproportionately.
When the median legislator is always the proposer, we show that for three classes of distributions—normal, uni-
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form and two-point—increasing volatility of the legislature raises the optimal supermajority rule. The first-order
intuition is that when the median legislator’s preferences are more dispersed around the representative citizen’s pre-
ferred policy, the median legislator is more likely to want to implement a “worse” policy. As a result, the social
planner wants to further constrain him. However, more volatile legislative preferences need not always imply greater
supermajorities. A mean preserving spread of the distribution of the median legislator’s preferences can be created
that (a) reduces the measure of blocked proposers, who are insensitive to marginal changes in the voting rule and (b)
increases the measure of heavily constrained proposers, who, on average, generate insufficient movement in policy.
The implication is insufficient average movement in policy. Thus, the optimal voting rule falls.
We then consider how the selection of the policy proposer affects the optimal voting rule. We consider randomly-
selected proposers who lie distance up to the left or right of the median legislator with equal probability. When the
legislature is highly polarized, more extreme proposers imply greater supermajorities since the views of proposers
who are more extreme within the legislature also tend to be further from the representative citizen’s, making it more
important to restrain them. However, when polarity is slight, the relationship between polarity and the optimal su-
permajority is U-shaped. More extreme proposers, who would like to propose more extreme policies on average, are
more constrained by the necessity to win the approval from moderate representatives. As the dispersion of the median
legislator around the representative citizen’s bliss point increases, then, it is more likely that, conditional on legislative
success, a more extreme proposer moves policy in the direction preferred by society.
We then study how initial policy bias affects the optimal voting rule. One’s intuition may be that initial policy bias
should induce the social planner to rely more on the legislature to determine policy. However, we prove that when
the dispersion of the median legislator around society’s preferred policy is sufficiently small relative to the variation
in society’s preferred policy, introducing slight initial policy bias raises the optimal voting rule. The intuition is that
with slight policy bias, the proposers who are more likely to be constrained by a given supermajority are those who
would move policy in the direction away from what the representative citizen prefers.
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2.7 Chapter 2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider α < 1/2. From equation (2.2) and the distribution of e, m and p, utility is
U =−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ xα
−∞
∫ 2(m+xα)
−∞
(e− 2(m+ xα))2dFp(p−m)
+
∫ 0
2(m+xα)
(e− p)2dFp(p−m) +
∫ ∞
0
e2dFp(p−m)dFm(m− e)
+
∫ −xα
xα
∫ 2(m+xα)
−∞
(e− 2(m+ xα))2dFp(p−m) +
∫ 2(m−xα)
2(m+xα)
(e− p)2dFp(p−m)
+
∫ ∞
2(m−xα)
(e− 2(m− xα))2dFp(p−m)dFm(m− e)
+
∫ ∞
−xα
∫ 0
−∞
e2dFp(p−m) +
∫ 2(m−xα)
0
(e− p)2dFp(p−m)
+
∫ ∞
2(m−xα)
(e− 2(m− xα))2dFp(p−m)dFm(m− e)dFe(e).
The first-order condition is
∂U
∂xα
=4
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −xα
−∞
∫ 2(m+xα)
−∞
(e− 2(m+ xα))dFp(p−m)dFm(m− e)
−
∫ ∞
xα
∫ ∞
2(m−xα)
(e− 2(m− xα))dFp(p−m)dFm(m− e)dFe(e)
=8
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −xα
−∞
∫ 2(m+xα)
−∞
(e− 2(m+ xα))dFp(p−m)dFm(m− e) dFe(e)
=8
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −xα
−∞
(e− 2(m+ xα))Fp(m+ 2xα)dFm(m− e)dFe(e),
where the second equality uses the symmetry of the distribution functions. Note that differentiation of the limits of
integration cancel each other out. We prove that the optimal voting rule is not a minority by showing that the first-
order condition is positive for any α < 1/2. To do this, we divide the possible realizations of m and e into three set
sequences, Nn, Pn and Rn, where n = 1, . . . ,∞. For two of these sets, Pn and Rn, the value of the integrand is
positive and for the third it is negative. A point-wise comparison of the elements of Nn and Pn, where the position
of the median legislator is equal, will show that the value of the integrand over Pn more than offsets the value of the
integrand over Nn.
72
N1 R1
P1
N2 R2 P2
N3
R3 P3
m = 0
e
m
e = 2(m + xα)
m = −xα
(2xα ,0)
(6xα, 2xα)
m = 2xα
Figure 2.12: The area under m = −xα is to be integrated. The shaded area to the right of e = 2(m + xα), Pn, has
a positively-valued integrand that more than offsets the negatively-valued integrand in the shaded area to the left of
e = 2(m+ xα), Nn.
Define m0 = −xα, mn = 2(mn−1 + xα) and the following sets,
Nn = {(m, e)|mn < m ≤ mn−1, e ≤ 2(m+ xα)},
Pn = {(m, e)|mn < m ≤ mn−1, e ≥ 2(2mn−1 + xα −m)} and
Rn = {(m, e)|mn < m ≤ mn−1, 2(m+ xα) < e < 2(2mn−1 + xα −m)}.
As required, the value of the integrand (e − 2(m + xα))Fp(m + 2xα|m)fm(m|e)fe(e) is negative over the set Nn
and positive over the sets Pn and Rn. Hence,
∂U
∂xα
= 8
∞∑
n=1
(∫∫
Nn
(e− 2(m+ xα))Fp(m+ 2xα|m)fm(m− e)fe(e)dmde
+
∫∫
Pn
(e− 2(m+ xα))Fp(m+ 2xα|m)fm(m− e)fe(e)dmde
+
∫∫
Rn
(e− 2(m+ xα))Fp(m+ 2xα|m)fm(m− e)fe(e)dmde
)
> 8
∞∑
n=1
(∫∫
Nn
(e− 2(m+ xα))Fp(m+ 2xα|m)fm(m− e)fe(e)dmde
+
∫∫
Pn
(e− 2(m+ xα))Fp(m+ 2xα|m)fm(m− e)fe(e)dmde
)
.
To show that for each element of Nn the absolute value of the integrand is no greater than the value of the integrand
of a corresponding element of Pn, let (m, e) ∈ Nn and define e′ = 4(mn−1 + xα) − e. Then (m, e′) ∈ Pn, since
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e ≤ 2(m+xα) by construction ofNn, and 4(mn−1+xα)−e ≥ 2(2mn−1+xα−m). Since 2(2mn−1+xα−m) < 0,
|e| > |e′| which, combined with the quasi-concavity and symmetry of fe around zero implies fe(e) < fe(e′). Also,
since m ≥ mn, m − e > e′ −m which, combined with the quasi-concavity and symmetry of fm around e implies
fm(m|e) < fm(m|e′). Finally, since m ≤ mn−1, |e − 2(m + xα)| ≤ (e′ − 2(m + xα)) (Figure 2.12 provides a
graphical depiction of this proof). 
Proof of Proposition 9: Let x∗α maximize equation (2.4). By the definition of x∗α, F
−1
l1
(α∗l1) = F
−1
l2
(α∗l2). Since
F−1l2 (α
∗
l2
) ≥ F−1l1 (α∗l2), this implies α∗l1 ≥ α∗l2 . If α∗l2 > 0 then F−1l2 (α∗l2) > F−1l1 (α∗l2) and α∗l1 > α∗l2 . 
Proof of Proposition 10: Let x′α = m¯ + , where  < e¯, the support of e (which could be infinite). Ex ante, the
probability of policy change is strictly positive since e + m¯ > m¯ for all e >  and e − m¯ < m¯ for all e < −. For
any value of µm, policy is either unchanged or any policy change moves policy closer to e. To see this let e ≥ 0
(the analysis for e < 0 is similar). For any m = e + µm < 0, S1 = 0 since |m| < m¯. Movement in policy is only
possible if m = e+ µm > m¯+ . Fix such an m. The feasible policy set, R(m,α) = [0, 2(m− m¯− )]. For all m,
2(m− m¯− )− e = e− 2(m¯+ − µm) < e since µm < m¯. Hence, any movement in policy is toward e and utility
under x′α is greater than under a voting rule where no change in policy is possible. 
Proof of Proposition 11: If ue > um, then
U =

−u2m if 0 < xα < ue−um2
− (ue−2(um+xα))2+u2m2 if ue−um2 < xα < min{ue − um, ue+um2 }
− (ue−2(um+xα))2+(ue+2(um−xα))22 if ue+um2 < xα < ue − um
−u2e+u2m2 if ue − um < xα < ue+um2
−u2e+(ue+2(um−xα))22 if max{ue − um, ue+um2 } < xα < ue + um
−u2e if ue + um < xα
and
∂U
∂xα
=

0 if 0 < xα < ue−um2
2(ue − 2(um + xα)) if ue−um2 < xα < min{ue − um, ue+um2 }
4(ue + 2xα) if ue+um2 < xα < ue − um
0 if ue − um < xα < ue+um2
2(ue + 2(um − xα)) if max{ue − um, ue+um2 } < xα < ue + um
0 if ue + um < xα
.
74
If ue < um then
U =

−u2m if 0 ≤ um−ue2
− (ue−2(um−xα))2+u2m2 if um−ue2 < xα < min{um − ue, um+ue2 }
− (ue−2(um−xα))2+(ue+2(um−xα))22 if um+ue2 < xα < um − ue
−u2e+u2m2 if um − ue < xα < um+ue2
−u2e+(ue+2(um−xα))22 if max{um − ue, um+ue2 } < xα < um + ue
−u2e if um + ue < xα
and
∂U
∂xα
=

0 if 0 ≤ um−ue2
−2(ue − 2(um − xα) if um−ue2 < xα < min{um − ue, um+ue2 }
8(um − xα) if um+ue2 < xα < um − ue
0 if um − ue < xα < um+ue2
2(ue + 2(um − xα)) if max{um − ue, um+ue2 } < xα < um + ue
0 if um + ue < xα
.
The utility from a voting rule xα ∈ [0, |ue−um|2 ] equals −µ2m. Over each interval where utility is a function of xα,
the second-order condition for a maximum is always satisfied. It is simple to show that the solution to the first-order
condition over each interval of xα satisfies the interval constraints only when max{ue+um2 , |ue − um|} < xα <
ue+um. The relevant first-order condition is 2(ue+ 2(um−xα)) = 0, which implies that x∗α = um+ue/2, yielding
utility −u2e/2. This exceeds −u2m only if ue <
√
2um. 
Proof of Proposition 12: The form of the first-order condition in the uniform case of the median proposer depends
on the relative values of a and b.
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Case 1: a > b
∂U
∂xα
=

− 2xα2a if xα < a−b2
2xα
2−4(a−b)xα+(a−b)2
a if
a−b
2 < xα < min{a− b, a+b2 }
2(3xα
2−4axα+a2+b2)
a if
a+b
2 < xα < a− b
−xα(xα2−(2a−b)xα+a2−b2)ab if a− b < xα < a+b2
− (xα−b)(a+b−xα)2ab if max{a− b, a+b2 } < xα < a+ b
0 if a+ b < xα.
If a > 5/4b, then for all xα ∈ [0,∞), ∂U∂xα < 0. Hence, x∗α = 0. If 5/4b > a > b, then there are two possible
solutions to the first-order condition; x∗α = 0 and x
∗
α = (2a − b + c)/2, where c =
√
5b2 − 4ab. Comparing utility
under the two voting rules gives
U
∣∣
xα=(2a−b+c)/2 =−
12a3 + 2ab(18b− 7c) + b2(5c− 11b) + a2(8c− 30b)
24a
>− b2/3 = U |xα=0 iff a <
(11 + 4
√
7)b
18
≈ 1.2b.
Case 2: a < b
∂U
∂xα
=

4xα
2
b if xα <
b−a
2
− (b−a)((b−2xα)2−ab)ab if b−a2 < xα < min{b− a, a+b2 }
4 (b−xα)
2
b if
a+b
2 < xα < b− a
−xα(xα2−(2a−b)xα+a2−b2)ab if b− a < xα < a+b2
− (xα−b)(a+b−xα)2ab if max{b− a, a+b2 } < xα < a+ b
0 if a+ b < xα.
For all values of a and b the first-order condition has a unique solution, x∗α = b. Hence, the optimal voting rule is
characterized by
x∗α =

0 if a > (11+4
√
7)b
18
2a−b+√5b2−4ab
2 if
(11+4
√
7)b
18 > a > b
b otherwise.

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Proof of Proposition 13: Letting µm = m− e in equation (2.6) and assuming x∗α > 0, we have
∂U
∂xα
= 8
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −xα−e
−2xα−e
(−e− 2(µm + xα))dFm(µm)dFe(e).
Expanding this gives
∂U
∂xα
= 8
∫ ∞
−∞
e(Fm(−xα − e)− Fm(−2xα − e))dFe(e)
− 2xα
∫ ∞
−∞
(Fm(−xα − e)− Fm(−2xα − e))dFe(e)
− 2
∫ ∞
−∞
µm(Fm(−xα − µm)− Fm(−2xα − µm))dFm(µm),
where the last term comes from interchanging the order of integration, µm and e. Converting the distributions to
standard normal distributions gives
∂U
∂xα
=− 8
∫ ∞
−∞
e(Φ(
−xα − e
σm
)− Φ(−2xα − e
σm
))φ(
e
σe
)de/σe
− 2xα
∫ ∞
−∞
(Φ(
−xα − e
σm
)− Φ(−2xα − e
σm
))φ(
e
σe
)de/σe
− 2
∫ ∞
−∞
µm(Φ(
−xα − µm
σe
)− Φ(−2xα − µm
σe
))φ(
µm
σm
)dµm/σm. (2.11)
From Patel and Read [1996],
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ(a+ bx)φ(x)dx = Φ(a/
√
1 + b2) and∫ ∞
−∞
xΦ(a+ bx)φ(x)dx =
b√
1 + b2
φ
(
a√
1 + b2
)
.
Defining δ =
√
σ2e + σ
2
m, equation (2.11) simplifies to
∂U
∂xα
=8
σ2e
δ
[
φ
(−xα
δ
)
− φ
(−2xα
δ
)]
− 2xα
[
Φ
(−xα
δ
)
− Φ
(−2xα
δ
)]
+
2σ2m
δ
[
φ
(−xα
δ
)
− φ
(−2xα
δ
)]
.
Thus, when the median legislator is always the proposer, and the optimal voting rule distance x∗α is strictly positive,
x∗α must solve
8
(
2σ2m + σ
2
e
2(σ2m + σ
2
e)
)
[φ (γ)− φ (2γ)]− 16γ [Φ (γ)− Φ (γ)] = 0.
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Define ∆(σ2e , σ
2
m) =
2σ2m+σ
2
e
2δ2 ,Γ(γ) = γ
[Φ(2γ)−Φ(γ)]
[φ(γ)−φ(2γ)] and γ(xα) =
xα
δ . Then x
∗
α solves
∆(σ2e , σ
2
m) = Γ(γ(xα)). (2.12)
To show that the optimal voting rule is unique it is sufficient to show that Γ(γ) is strictly increasing in γ. To do
this we use the following lemma due to Pinelis [2002].
Lemma 6. Let −∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞ and let f and g be differentiable functions on (a, b). Assume that either g′ > 0
everywhere on (a, b) or g′ < 0 on (a, b). Furthermore, suppose that f(a+) = g(a+) = 0 or f(b−) = g(b−) = 0 and
f ′/g′ is strictly increasing on (a, b). Then the ratio f/g is strictly increasing on (a, b).
To use this lemma, let f(γ) = Φ (2γ)− Φ (γ) and g(γ) = [φ (γ)− φ (2γ)] /γ. Then
f ′(γ) = 2φ (2γ)− φ (γ) = e
−2γ2
√
2pi
(2− e 3γ
2
2 ),
and
g′(γ) =
γ2(4φ (2γ)− φ (γ))− φ (γ) + φ (2γ)
γ2
=
e−2γ
2
γ2
√
2pi
(1 + 4γ2 − e 3γ
2
2 (1 + γ2)).
Let γ¯ ≈ 0.6536 be the unique positive root to the transcendental equation g′(γ) = 0. Then over (0, γ¯), g′(γ) > 0 and
over (γ¯,∞), g′(γ) < 0. Also, f(0) = g(0) = 0 and f(∞) = g(∞) = 0. Therefore,
f ′(γ)
g′(γ)
=
γ2
1 + γ2 + 1−2γ
2
e
3γ2
2 −2
and
(
f ′(γ)
g′(γ)
)′
=
γ
(
4 + 2e3γ
2
+ 3e
3γ2
2 (−2 + γ2 − 2γ4)
)
(
1 + 4γ2 − e 3γ22 (1 + γ2)
)2 . (2.13)
Equation (2.13) is increasing for all γ ∈ (0,∞)\{γ¯} since
∂
∂γ
(4 + 2e3γ
2
+ 3e
3γ2
2 (−2 + γ2 − 2γ4)) = 3e 3γ
2
2 γ
(
4e
3γ2
2 − (4 + 5γ2 + 6γ4)
)
and
∂
∂γ
(4e
3γ2
2 − (4 + 5γ2 + 6γ4)) = 2γ
(
−5 + 6e 3γ
2
2 − 12γ2
)
,
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which is positive for all γ > 0. Hence, by Lemma 6, Γ is strictly increasing over the intervals (0, γ¯) and (γ¯,∞). By
continuity of the function, Γ is strictly increasing over [0,∞).
We now use L’Hoˆpital’s rule twice to determine when the first-order condition characterizes x∗α. Let ΓN (γ) =
γ(Φ(2γ)− Φ(γ)) and ΓD(γ) = φ(γ)− φ(2γ). Then
lim
γ→0
Γ′N (γ)
Γ′D(γ)
= lim
γ→0
γ(2φ(2γ)− φ(γ)) + Φ(2γ)− Φ(γ)
γ(4φ(2γ)− φ(γ)) =
0
0
,
where we use the fact that φ′(λγ) = −λγφ(λγ), and
lim
γ→0
Γ′′N (γ)
Γ′′D(γ)
= lim
γ→0
4φ(2γ)− 2φ(γ) + γ(4φ′(2γ)− φ′(γ))
4φ(2γ)− φ(γ) + γ(8φ′(2γ)− φ′(γ)) =
2
3
= Γ(0).
The optimal voting rule is implicitly given by the solution to equation (2.12) if σ2e > 2σ
2
m. Otherwise, α
∗ = 1/2.
Next we show that the optimal voting rule increases with σ2m. As σ
2
m increases, the left-hand side of equation
(2.12) increases since
∂∆(σ2e , σ
2
m)
∂σ2m
=
σ2e
2(σ2e + σ
2
m)
2
> 0.
An increase in σ2m evaluating at xα = x
∗
α leads to decreases in γ and Γ(γ). Hence, the right-hand side of equation
(2.12) falls at xα = x∗α. Thus, the optimal voting rule must increase with σ
2
m.
Next, we show that the optimal voting rule is decreasing in the volatility of the representative citizen’s bliss point.
Differentiating equation (2.12) with respect to σ2e gives
∂2U
∂xα∂σ2e
∣∣∣∣∣
xα=x∗α
= −σ
2
m (φ(γ)− φ(2γ))
2(σ2e + σ
2
m)
2
+
(
γ(σ2e + 2σ
2
m)(4φ(2γ)− φ(γ))
2(σ2e + σ
2
m)
− (Φ(γ)− Φ(2γ))− γ(2φ(2γ)− φ(γ))
)
∂γ
∂σ2e
=
σ2e(1− γ2)φ(γ)− (σ2e + 4σ2mγ2)φ(2γ)
4(σ2e + σ
2
m)
2
< σ2e
(1− γ2)φ(γ)− (1 + 2γ2)φ(2γ)
4(σ2e + σ
2
m)
2
.
The second equality follows from using equation (2.12) to substitute for γ(Φ(2γ)− Φ(γ)) and substituting ∂γ∂σ2e with
− γ2(σ2e+σ2m) . The inequality follows since 2σ
2
m > σ
2
e . Again it is straightforward to verify that this inequality is
negative for all γ.
Finally, we show that x∗α(γσe, γσm) = γx
∗
α(σe, σm). Let σ
′
m = ησm and σ
′
e = ησe. Then, ∆(σ
′2
e , σ
′2
m) =
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∆(σ2e , σ
2
m). Hence, γ(x
′
α
∗
) = γ(x∗α), which implies
x′α
∗√
σ′2m + σ′2e
=
x∗α√
σ2m + σ
2
e
⇒ x′α∗ =
(√
σ′2m + σ′2e√
σ2m + σ
2
e
)
x∗α = ηx
∗
α. 
Proof of Proposition 14: F second-order stochastically dominates G. Since (10 > 1 + 8.9), xα = 10 is a possible
optimal voting rule under the distribution F since the first-order condition that characterizes the optimal rule when m
is uniformly distributed continues to hold. It is sufficient to check that xα = 0 gives a lower level of utility, which it
indeed does, since U(xα = 0;F ) ∼ −30.0316 < U(xα = 10;F ) ∼ −0.32897.
Under the distribution G, xα = 10 is no longer a possible optimal voting rule since the first-order condition that
characterizes x∗α whenm is uniformly distributed no longer holds. Since 10 < 1+9.1, there is additional density over
the negative values of the integrand. Since the density of m when m ∈ [e, e − 9.1] is twice the density of m when
m ∈ [e− 9.1, e− 10], then x∗α must solve
∫ 10−xα
−a
∫ −xα
e−10
(e− 2(m+ xα))dmde+
∫ 9.1−xα
−a
∫ −xα
e−9.1
(e− 2(m+ xα))dmde = 0.
Evaluating, this simplifies to
1069.15− 313.415xα + 30.65xα2 − xα3 ∼ 0,
which implies that xα∗G ∼ 9.989. 
Proof of Proposition 15: When up > xα then
∂U
∂xα
= −4
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −xα−e
−2xα−up−e
(e+ 2(µm + xα))dFm(µm)dFe(e). (2.14)
Differentiating equation (2.14) with respect to up gives
∂2U
∂xα∂up
= 4
∫ ∞
−∞
(e+ 2xα + 2up)fm(−2xα − up − e)dFe(e). (2.15)
The function e+2xα+2up is symmetric around−2xα−2up which is less than−2xα−up. The function fm(−2xα−
up − e) is symmetric around −2xα − up which is less than zero, while the function fe(e) is symmetric around zero.
Hence, equation (2.15), evaluated at xα = x∗α, is positive and the optimal voting rule must increase. 
Proof of Proposition 16: Since x∗α
1 > 0 equation (2.5) holds with equality at xα = x∗α
1 under the distribution
F 1p . A point-wise comparison shows that equation (2.5) is positive at xα = x
∗
α
1 under the distribution F 2p . Since
F 1p (z) = F
2
p (z), for all −x∗α1 ≤ z ≤ x∗α1, the value of the integrand in equation (2.5) is the same under F 1p and F 2p
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for all m such that −3x∗α1 < m < −x∗α1. Now we show that conditional on m < −3x∗α1, the value of the integrand
over e is positive for any distribution Fp by comparing points symmetrically aroundm = e. For every e < 2(m−x∗α1)
let e′ = 2m− e. By symmetry of fm, fm(m− e) = fm(m− e′). Also, 2(m− x∗α1)− e < e′ − 2(m− x∗α1) since
m < −3x∗α1. Finally, since m < 0, |e′| < |e|, which, together with symmetry and quasi-concavity of fe implies
f(e) < f(e′). Since F 2p (z) ≤ F 1p (z), for all z > x∗α1, strictly for some z, then F 2p (m− 2x∗α1) ≥ F 1p (m− 2x∗α1), for
all m < −3x∗α1, strictly for some m. Thus, equation (2.5) is positive at xα = x∗α1 under the distribution F 2p , which
implies x∗α
2 > x∗α
1. 
Proof of Proposition 17: The first-order condition when the median legislator is the proposer is defined by equation
(2.6). Since b > a, the optimal voting rule distance when the median legislator proposes is b. If the median legislator
m is replaced as proposer by someone who with equal probability, lies distance up to either the left or the right
of m, then the first-order condition is defined by equation (2.5), where Fp(z) = 0 if z < −up, Fp(z) = 1/2 if
−up ≤ z < up, and Fp(z) = 1 if up ≤ z. If b − a < up < b − a/2, then Fp(b − a/2) = 1 and Fp(b − a) = 1/2.
Evaluated at α∗m, the first-order condition is negative, implying α
∗
p < α
∗
m. If up ≤ b − a then Fp(b − a/2) = 1 and
Fp(b − a) = 1. Evaluated at α∗m, the first-order condition is zero, implying α∗p = α∗m. If up ≥ b then Fp(b) = 1/2
and Fp(b− a) = 1/2. Evaluated at α∗m, the first-order condition is zero, implying α∗p = α∗m. 
Proof of Proposition 18: When up < x∗α the effect on utility from and increase in xα is
∂U
∂xα
= −4
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −xα−e
−2xα+up−e
(e+ 2(µm + xα))dFm(µm)
+
∫ −xα−e
−2xα−up−e
(e+ 2(µm + xα))dFm(µm)dFe(e).
We see that
∂2U
∂xα∂up
∣∣∣∣∣
up=0
= 4
∫ ∞
−∞
(e+ 2xα)fm(2xα + e)− (e+ 2xα)fm(2xα + e)dFe(e) = 0, (2.16)
and
∂3U
∂xα∂u2p
∣∣∣∣∣
up=0
= 8
∫ ∞
−∞
2fm(2xα + e) + (e+ 2xα)f
′
m(2xα + e)dFe(e). (2.17)
When e ∼ N(0, σ2e) and µm ∼ N(0, σ2m) equation (2.17) simplifies to
∂3U
∂xα∂up
∣∣∣∣∣
up=0
= 8
∫ ∞
−∞
(
2− (e+ 2xα)
2
σ2m
)
φ( 2xα+eσm )
σm
φ( eσe )
σe
de
= 8
φ( 2xαδ )
δ5/2
(σ4e + 3σ
2
eσ
2
m + 2σ
2
m(σ
2
m − 2xα2)). (2.18)
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The positive root of equation (2.18) is x˜∗α =
√
σ4e+3σ
2
eσ
2
m+2σ
4
m
2
√
σ2m
. So if x∗α > x˜
∗
α then a marginal increase in up from
zero leads to a reduction in the optimal voting rule. Let γ˜(σ2m, σ
2
e) =
√
σ2e+2σ
2
m
2
√
σ2m
. Then
∆(σ2e , σ
2
m) = Γ(γ˜(σ
2
m, σ
2
e)), (2.19)
defines σ2e as an implicit function of σ
2
m, σ˜e
2(σ2m), for which the optimal voting rule is exactly x˜
∗
α when up = 0.
Let (σ2m, σ
2
e) solve equation (2.19) and let σ
′
m = ησm and σ
′
e = ησe. Then, ∆(σ
′2
e , σ
′2
m) = ∆(σ
2
e , σ
2
m) and
γ˜(σ′2m, σ
′2
e ) = γ˜(σ
2
m, σ
2
e). Hence, (σ
′2
m, σ
′2
e ) also solves equation (2.19) and it follows that σ˜2e(σ
2
m) = βσ
2
m.
We solve for β by substituting σ2e = βσ
2
m into equation (2.19), i.e., β is the solution to
4η2
8η2 − 2 = η
[Φ (2η)− Φ (η)]
[φ (η)− φ (2η)] ,
where η =
√
β+2
2 . Solving numerically gives β ≈ 1.33872. Recall from Proposition 13, as σ2e increases, x∗α decreases.
Hence, as σ2e increases above σ˜
2
e(σ
2
m), equation (2.18) becomes positive, implying that the optimal voting rule must
increase, and as σ2e decreases below σ˜
2
e(σ
2
m), equation (2.18) becomes negative, implying that the optimal voting rule
must decrease. 
Proposition 19 preliminaries: As a preliminary step in proving Proposition 19, we give a more detailed charac-
terization of the optimal voting rule when the initial policy is unbiased and the legislative proposers are sufficiently
extreme.
Lemma 7. Suppose S0 = 0, e ∼ N(0, σ2e), m ∼ N(e, σ2m), and define u˜p(σ2e , σ2m) implicitly to be the solution to
∆(σ2e , σ
2
m) =
up(Φ(3up/δ)− Φ(up/δ))
δ(φ(up/δ)− φ(3up/δ)) .
Then if up > u˜p(σ2e , σ
2
m), the optimal voting rule increases with the volatility σ
2
m in the representativeness of society
by the legislature.
When up > xα, the proposer nearest to the status quo is never constrained. An increase in σ2m implies that, on
average, a constrained median proposer lies further from e. Therefore, constraining the proposer further by increasing
xα, reduces the feasible policy set, improving welfare.
The function u˜p(σ2e , σ
2
m) is the polarity distance, given σ
2
e and σ
2
m at which x
∗
α(up) = up. Characterizing this
function allows us to provide sufficient parametric conditions under which x∗α(up) ≤ up. Since u˜p(σ2e , σ2m) is homo-
geneous of degree one, without loss of generality, we normalize σ2e = 1 and show in Figure 2.13 how u˜p(1, σ
2
m) varies
with σ2m. Consistent with Lemma 7, u˜p(1, σ
2
m) increases in σ
2
m. As σ
2
m increases, so does x
∗
α, so that u˜p(1, σ
2
m) must
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increase to maintain equality with x∗α.
u˜p(1, σ
2
m)
σ2m
4
3
2
1
0
1 2 3
Figure 2.13: u˜p(1, σ2m) as a function of σ
2
m.
Proof of Lemma 7: When S0 = 0, e ∼ N(0, σ2e), m ∼ N(e, σ2m) and up > xα the optimal voting rule must satisfy
equation (2.14). Define ψ = upδ and Ψ(γ, ψ) = γ
(Φ(2γ+ψ)−Φ(γ))
(φ(γ)−φ(2γ+ψ)) . An approach similar to that used in the proof of
Proposition 13 shows that at the optimal voting rule distance
∆(σ2e , σ
2
m) = Ψ(γ, ψ). (2.20)
The function Ψ is decreasing in ψ since Φ(2γ+ψ)−Φ(γ)φ(γ)−φ(2γ+ψ) is the inverse of the expected value of a truncated standard
normally distributed random variable between γ and 2γ + ψ. As up increases, ψ increases. By Proposition 15, x∗α is
increasing in up, so γ also increases. Thus, Ψ must be increasing in γ for equation (2.20) to hold.
We now show that there exists a u˜p such that for all up ≥ u˜p, x∗α ≤ up. Using the implicit function theorem, we
derive how up affects x∗α.
∂Ψ
∂ψ
=
γ(φ(2γ + ψ)(φ(γ)− φ(2γ + ψ))− Φ(2γ + ψ) + Φ(γ))
(φ(γ)− φ(2γ + ψ))2 ,
∂Ψ
∂γ
= [(Φ(2γ + ψ)− Φ(γ) + 2γ(φ(2γ + ψ)− φ(γ)))(φ(γ)− φ(2γ + ψ))
+γ(Φ(2γ + ψ)− Φ(γ))(γφ(γ)− 2(2γ + ψ)φ(2γ + ψ))] /(φ(γ)− φ(2γ + ψ))2,
and
∂x∗α
∂up
= −
∂Ψ
∂ψ
∂ψ
∂up
∂Ψ
∂γ
∂γ
∂x∗α
= −
∂Ψ
∂ψ
∂Ψ
∂γ
.
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Hence, when x∗α = up,
∂x∗α
∂up
∣∣
x∗α=up = −
ψ(φ(3ψ)(φ(ψ)− φ(3ψ))− Φ(3ψ) + Φ(ψ))
[(Φ(3ψ)− Φ(ψ) + 2ψ(φ(3ψ)− φ(ψ)))(φ(ψ)− φ(3ψ))
+ψ(Φ(3ψ)− Φ(ψ))(ψφ(ψ)− 6φ(3ψ))].
(2.21)
At up = 0 equation (2.21) equals one, and a graphical analysis shows that the function is monotonically decreasing
(see Figure 2.14). Hence, the ratio of x∗α/up at x
∗
α = up is decreasing. Thus, for any value of σm and σe there
∂x∗α
∂up
∣∣∣∣x∗α=up
up
1
0
1 2
Figure 2.14: When x∗α = up, the increase in x
∗
α as up increases is always less than 1.
is a unique up, u˜p, at which x∗α = u˜p and for all up ≥ u˜p, x∗α ≤ up. This critical polarity distance u˜p solves
∆(σ2e , σ
2
m) = Ψ(ψ,ψ). Note that a proportionally-equal increase in ψ and γ increases Ψ.
Now we show that if up > x∗α, then x
∗
α is increasing in σ
2
m . As shown in the proof of Proposition 13, the left-hand
side of equation (2.20) is increasing in σ2m. As σ
2
m increases, ψ and γ decrease by the same proportion, which implies
that Ψ decreases. Hence, equation (2.20) becomes negative and x∗α must increase to ensure the equality of equation
(2.20) at the optimum. 
Proof of Proposition 19: When the median legislator proposes policy, the change in utility from a marginal change
in the voting rule distance is
∂U(xα, S0)
∂xα
=4
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫ S0−xα
S0−2xα
[
e− 2(m+ xα) + S0
]
dFm(m− e)
−
∫ S0+2xα
S0+xα
[
e− 2(m− xα) + S0
]
dFm(m− e)
)
dFe(e). (2.22)
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Differentiating equation (2.22) with respect to S0 gives
∂2U(xα, S0)
∂xα∂S0
=4
∫ ∞
−∞
[(e− S0) (fm(S0 − xα − e) + fm(S0 + xα − e))
− (e− S0 + 2xα)fm(S0 − 2xα − e)− (e− S0 − 2xα)fm(S0 + 2xα − e)
+
∫ S0−xα
S0−2xα
1dFm(m− e)−
∫ S0+2xα
S0+xα
1dFm(m− e)
]
dFe(e). (2.23)
Evaluated at S0 = 0, equation (2.23) is zero:
∂3U(xα, S0)
∂xα∂S20
=4
∫ ∞
−∞
[(e− S0) (f ′m(S0 − xα − e) + f ′m(S0 + xα − e)) (2.24)
− (e− S0 + 2xα)f ′m(S0 − 2xα − e)− (e− S0 − 2xα)f ′m(S0 + 2xα − e)dFe(e).
Evaluated at S0 = 0, equation (2.24) simplifies to
∂3U(xα, S0)
∂xα∂S20
∣∣∣
S0=0
=8
∫ ∞
−∞
ef ′m(xα − e)− (e− 2xα)f ′m(2xα − e)dFe(e). (2.25)
2.25. When e ∼ N(0, σ2e) and m ∼ N(e, σ2m), equation (2.25) becomes
∂3U(xα, S0)
∂xα∂S20
=8φ(
2xα
δ
)
σ2mσ
2
e
δ5/2
(e
3xα
2
2δ2 σ2e(δ
2 − xα2)− σ2eδ2 − 4σ2mxα2). (2.26)
At xα = 0, equation (2.26) equals zero and is decreasing in xα for all xα > 0. To see this, differentiate the bracketed
term in equation (2.26) with respect to xα and define θ = xα2/δ2.
∂
∂xα
(e
3xα
2
2δ2 σ2e(δ
2 − xα2)− σ2eδ2 − 4σ2mxα2) = −8σ2mxα + e
3xα
2
2δ2 σ2exα(δ
2 − 3xα2)/δ2
= −xα(8σ2m + σ2ee
3
2 θ(3θ − 1))
< −xασ2e(4 + e
3
2 θ(3θ − 1))
< 0,
where the first inequality follows since σ2e < 2σ
2
m.
Since equation (2.26) is negative for all xα and σ2e < 2σ
2
m, it must be negative for the optimal voting rule when
initial policy is unbiased. Hence, the first-order condition evaluated at the optimal voting rule when initial policy is
unbiased becomes negative as S0 increases.
Next we show that a marginal movement of initial policy away from the representative citizen’s expected bliss point
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increases the optimal voting rule if the proposer’s polarity exceeds the optimal voting rule distance and σ2m > λσ
2
e .
When up > xα then
∂U(xα, S0)
∂xα
= 2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ 2xα+up+S0−e
xα+S0−e
(e+ 2(µm − xα)− S0)dFm(µm) (2.27)
−
∫ −xα+S0−e
−2xα−up+S0−e
(e+ 2(µm + xα)− S0)dFm(µm)dFe(e).
Differentiating equation (2.27) with respect to S0 gives
∂2U(xα, S0)
∂xα∂S0
= 2
∫ ∞
−∞
[Fm(−xα + S0 − e)− Fm(−2xα − up + S0 − e) (2.28)
−Fm(2xα + up + S0 − e) + Fm(xα + S0 − e)
+(−2(xα + up) + S0 − e)fm(−2xα − up + S0 − e)− (S0 − e)fm(−xα + S0 − e)
+ (2(xα + up) + S0 − e)fm(2xα + up + S0 − e)− (S0 − e)fm(xα + S0 − e)] dFe(e).
Evaluated at S0 = 0, equation (2.28) equals zero.
∂3U(xα, S0)
∂xα∂S20
=2
∫ ∞
−∞
[(2(xα + up) + S0 − e)f ′m(2xα + up + S0 − e) (2.29)
+ (−2(xα + up) + S0 − e)f ′m(−2xα − up + S0 − e)
−(S0 − e)(f ′m(xα + S0 − e) + f ′m(−xα + S0 − e))] dFe(e).
Evaluated at S0 = 0, equation (2.29) simplifies to (2.10). When e ∼ N(0, σ2e) and m ∼ N(e, σ2m), equation (2.10)
becomes
∂3U(xα, S0)
∂xα∂S20
=
√
8√
piδ5
(
e−
xα
2
2δ2 σ2eσ
2
m(δ
2 − xα2) (2.30)
−e−
(2xα+up)
2
2δ2 σ3m(σ
2
eδ
2 + u2p(δ
2 + σ2m) + 2upxα(δ
2 + 2σ2m) + 4σ
2
mxα
2)
)
Hence, if x∗α > δ, the first-order condition evaluated at the optimal voting rule when initial policy is unbiased becomes
negative as S0 increases. The optimal voting rule decreases as S0 increases from zero.
It remains to establish when x∗α > δ holds. Let up = δ. Then x
∗
α = δ if
Φ(3)− Φ(1)
φ(1)− φ(3) =
σ2e + 2σ
2
m
2(σ2e + σ
2
m)
, (2.31)
which holds when σ
2
m
σ2e
= λ, where λ is defined in the proposition. By Lemma 7, as σ2m increases, so does x
∗
α/δ. From
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Lemma 7, if up > u˜p then up > x∗α. From Proposition 7, if up increases, x
∗
α increases. Hence, x
∗
α > δ and the
optimal voting rule decreases in S0 if σ2m > λσ
2
e and up > u˜p. 
Proof of Proposition 20: In the limit as up →∞, x∗α = δ if
1− Φ(1)
φ(1)
=
σ2e + 2σ
2
m
2(σ2e + σ
2
m)
, (2.32)
which holds when σ
2
m
σ2e
= χ where χ is defined in the proposition. By Lemma 7, as σ2m increases x
∗
α/δ increases.
Also, from Proposition 15, as up increases, so does x∗α. Hence, x
∗
α < δ for all up if σ
2
m < χσ
2
e . By equation (2.30),
as up → ∞ the second term goes to zero, while the first term remains strictly positive. Hence, there exists a u¯p such
that for all up > u¯p the optimal voting rule increases in S0. 
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